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Abstract 
 
This paper addresses the question whether unconditional foreign aid accelerates or delays 
macroeconomic stabilizations. It first reviews models offering an explanation for delayed 
stabilization processes and analyzes whether the incorporation of unconditional foreign aid in 
these models implies an earlier or, as predicted by the so-called crisis hypothesis, a later date 
of stabilization. The last part of the paper builds on Casella and Eichengreen (1996) who first 
used Alesina and Drazen’s (1991) war-of-attrition model to investigate the consequences of 
anticipated foreign aid on the expected date of stabilization. Casella and Eichengreen’s main 
result, namely that foreign aid that is announced or disbursed after critical dates will delay 
stabilization, will be shown to be based on an invalidly modified equilibrium condition. A 
correct incorporation of anticipated foreign aid in the war-of-attrition model yields the result 
that foreign aid unambiguously accelerates stabilization. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Starting after World War II, massive foreign aid programs have been launched to alleviate 
poverty and to stimulate growth in developing countries. Net official development assistance 
to all development countries accounted to 364.7 billion in current U.S. dollars between 1995 
and 2001 alone.1 After more than fifty years of transfers, a vivid discussion on the 
effectiveness of these programs is led both by economists and the public. Among economists, 
there seems to be an emerging consensus that the record of foreign aid programs is clearly 
disappointing with respect to results at the macro level. Boone (1996) shows that foreign aid 
does not significantly improve investment or benefit the poor as measured by improvements 
in human development indicators. Instead he finds that aid increases the size of government 
spending in all types of political regimes. Burnside and Dollar (1997) provide empirical 
evidence that in the presence of poor policies, aid has no positive impact on growth. In 
contrast, aid stimulates growth in developing countries with sound fiscal, monetary, and trade 
policies. While these findings underline that the goals of foreign aid have at best been 
achieved to a limited extent, some authors even postulate that foreign aid may be detrimental 
to the recipient country: A prominent German newspaper titled recently “Je mehr Hilfe, desto 
größer die Armut”.2
To avoid remaining at the level of mere provocation as the quote above, this paper focuses 
on one specific effect of foreign aid when investigating the (potentially even adverse) 
consequences of foreign aid, namely on how foreign aid affects the date of macroeconomic 
stabilizations. For this purpose, the terms macroeconomic stabilization and socially beneficial 
reform will be used synonymously: both are defined by bringing welfare reducing distortions 
or deadweight losses to an end. Concentrating on those changes in a country’s welfare level 
that are induced by reforms, only foreign aid that can be shown to accelerate the 
implementation of reforms will raise the recipient country’s welfare. In contrast, the claim 
that foreign aid is detrimental to a recipient country seems to be justified whenever foreign aid 
induces a delayed adoption of a superior policy.  
Obviously, foreign aid has numerous and diverse implications for the welfare level of 
respective recipient countries besides the one investigated here. Furthermore, explanations for 
the disappointing record of foreign aid should not only be sought in its effect on recipient 
countries’ policies, but also in the donor countries’ motives, the organization of international 
2
                                                 
1 The figure includes both bilateral and multilateral net official development assistance flows and stems from 
Worldbank (2003), p.200. 
2 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23.3.2004, p.21. A further classic reference is Erler (1985). 
 
financial institutions, or in the design of foreign aid programs, to mention just a few 
determinants of the success of foreign aid programs. Nevertheless the approach chosen here 
captures a relevant as well as controversial aspect of foreign aid programs that politicians or 
bureaucrats often neglect when designing development cooperation programs. Foreign aid 
will be modeled as accruing directly to the government, which obviously is an inappropriate 
way of modeling traditional project aid but captures the idea of general budget support quite 
exactly. Thus, this paper might also offer valuable insights for the current controversy on 
providing aid in form of budget support instead of project aid. 
To address the central question of this paper, namely “Does foreign aid delay 
stabilization?” the paper is organized as follows: chapter II reviews models offering 
explanations for non-adoption or delay of macroeconomic stabilizations. Chapter III builds on 
these models by investigating whether the incorporation of foreign aid implies an earlier or, as 
predicted by the so-called crisis hypothesis, a later date of stabilization. Chapter IV analyzes 
the addition of anticipated foreign aid to a war-of-attrition model of delayed stabilization to 
show that, in contrast to the results obtained by Casella and Eichengreen (1996), anticipated 
foreign aid can be shown to unambiguously accelerate stabilization. Chapter V concludes. 
 
II. Models of delayed stabilization 
 
Talking about reforms one important distinction should be kept in mind: while there are 
reforms for which there are clearly defined losers ex ante, as for example cutting back 
subsidies, the focus of this paper will be on those reforms that are expected to be of general 
benefit.3 Macroeconomic stabilizations provide a good example for the latter case, as they are 
a means to leave behind an economic situation characterized by distortions affecting every 
agent of an economy to some, possibly differing degree. In this context, a very basic, minimal 
definition of reform underlying the models presented in this chapter is the adoption of a 
superior policy. 
If reform corresponds to the adoption of a superior policy, there is a puzzling question that 
comes to mind immediately: why, in reality, are changes that a social planner would adopt 
since they are perceived as raising social welfare often delayed for long periods of time or not 
enacted at all? The following will offer an overview on models that address exactly this 
3
                                                 
3 Cf. Drazen (2000), p.405.  
 
puzzle. Section one focuses on models that make use of non-political, mainly economic 
arguments while section two reviews political economy models.4
 
1. Non-political, economic arguments 
 
A broad variety of economic arguments has been used to explain non-adoption or delay of 
socially beneficial reform: Williamson (1994b) assigns a crucial role to lack of human capital 
or asymmetric information between experts and the constituency that cannot be convinced of 
the superiority of reform. Orphanides’ (1996) main idea is that some situations are more 
favorable than others for implementing policy changes. Thus, the key tradeoff faced by 
politicians is between balancing the costs of continuing distortions that characterize the status 
quo against the benefit of a possibly less costly future stabilization. Drudi and Prati (2000) 
make the point that delay of debt stabilization may serve a strategic role, namely to signal 
fiscal sustainability. 
 
1.1 Lack of human capital 
As Drazen (2000: 407) points out a very simple explanation for failure to change policy is 
ignorance of how to do so or disagreement by social-welfare maximizing politicians which 
alternative policy should be adopted. While this explanation might not necessarily be 
empirically irrelevant, it cannot explain the interesting question of why clearly superior 
alternatives to current policy are not enacted. 
Williamson (1994b) stresses the crucial role of economic experts who have knowledge 
and skills decisive for the processing of economic reforms. To implement their reform agenda 
these experts have to win political support. Thus, asymmetric information between experts 
and the constituency that cannot be convinced to adopt a superior policy can be a first reason 
for inaction. A second reason that could hinder a country from carrying out reforms, even if 
there is agreement on which policy can be considered socially superior to the status quo, is 
lack of human capital, or in Williamson’s terminology, lack of “technopols”, i.e. economic 
experts assuming positions of political responsibility. Obviously, different kind of reform 
programs hinge on knowledge and expertise to differing extents so that the argument offered 
4
                                                 
4 A comprehensive introductory overview on the different strands of research on delayed reform is given in 
chapter 10 of Drazen (2000). Sturzenegger and Tommasi’s (1998) book contains many published political 
economy papers on reform. After presenting the most important approaches to delayed reform, Rodrik (1993) 
discusses whether these models can be normatively used for policy analysis and policy design. Bruno’s (1998) 
survey encompasses the empirical literature besides the theoretical one. 
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above can explain delay of some kind of reform programs but not of others. Reduction of 
excessive deficits, for example, does not seem to require elaborate economic expertise.  
More generally, lack of any kind of capital or infrastructure may be a reason for non-
adoption of reform. In this context, delay of reform can be explained by assuming that the 
accumulation of capital necessary for the implementation of reform takes time.  
 
1.2 Stochastic economic environment for reform 
According to Orphanides (1996), in a stochastic economic environment delay in the 
adoption of stabilization programs can be optimal, and does not necessarily imply irrational 
behavior of politicians. The basic idea underlying this “optimal waiting” model is that some 
situations are more favorable than others for implementing policy changes. Consequently, it 
may be beneficial to wait if there are expectations for an improved future climate in which to 
carry out a stabilization attempt. The key trade-off is between balancing the costs of 
continuing distortions against the benefit of a possibly less costly future stabilization, where 
the latter might stem from required adjustments being less painful or from smaller costs in 
case of a failed stabilization attempt. 
This basic idea is applied to inflation stabilization via exchange rate management, which 
requires a sufficient stock of foreign exchange reserves. Initial conditions are characterized by 
the stochastic variable tR with support ],[ RR  that is determined completely by the level of 
reserves available to the government at the start of the stabilization program. Higher values of 
tR denote more favorable initial conditions. A stabilization program is summarized by the 
adjustment effort A ],0[ A∈ . The government is assumed to face a high inflation and a rapid 
depreciation of the currency. Before stabilization inflation induces a fix resource loss c per 
period. Orphanides’ original model is multistage: it embeds an optimal stopping problem 
(namely, the decision to successfully complete or abandon a stabilization attempt) in an 
optimal starting problem (the decision of whether to initiate a stabilization). 
Delaying stabilization imposes costs D equal to the sum of per period costs of inflation, c, 
and expected discounted costs of a new start decision state with uncertain reserves in the 
following period (“expected cost-to-go”). The latter are denoted by )(REV⋅β , where β is the 
discount factor, V(R) is the minimum cost-to-go conditional on the initial conditions R that 
will be specified more precisely below, and E is the expectation of V over the distribution of 
initial conditions R. This yields  
(1) D = c + )(REV⋅β . 
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In contrast to that, initiating a stabilization induces costs of S given the choice of the optimal 
level of adjustment A, that is the level of adjustment effort that minimizes S: 
(2) S( tR ) = c + f + w(A) + ),,( 1 ARXEW tt+⋅β .  
S( tR ) is the sum of the continuing inflation cost, c, fix costs of the adjustment program, f, 
variable costs of the program, w(A), that are convex in the level of adjustment made, and the 
expected discounted costs in period t+1 (a stop decision state) given the optimal adjustment 
level A and initial conditions R, ),,( 1 ARXEW tt+⋅β . The expectation is taken with respect to 
1+tX , the stochastic component of the demand for reserves in the next period that has to be 
met to successfully complete the stabilization attempt. While the cost of waiting and delaying 
stabilization, D, is constant with respect to the level of the initial conditions variable tR , the 
costs of starting a stabilization attempt, S( tR ), are decreasing in tR .  
How does the solution to the government’s decision problem look like? The government’s 
objective is to minimize the expected present discounted costs that are incurred until a 
successful stabilization is completed. Thus, in a start decision state, for )()( RSDRS >>  the 
optimal stabilization initiation policy corresponds to 
(3) }),(min{)( DRSRV =  
and can be characterized by a critical level of reserves in the current period t, R*, that is 
defined by the intersection of  S( tR ) and D as depicted in Figure II.1.  
)(RS
D
)(RV
R*Rdelay stabilization start stabilization
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It is optimal to attempt a stabilization with an optimal level of initial adjustment A*(R) if 
R>R*, while to wait if R<R*. This yields the intuitive result that, if the government believes 
that the costs of implementing a stabilization program in the future may be lower than in the 
present due to better initial conditions, namely a higher level of initial reserves R, it will use 
the option of waiting for better circumstances before starting a costly stabilization attempt. In 
such a case delay of stabilization may be the best decision. 
The support of the exchange rate is considered to be the determining factor of stabilization 
success. Thus, similarly to the start decision being summarized by a critical level of reserves 
R*, the decision whether to successfully complete a stabilization attempt or to abandon it can 
be characterized by a critical level X*(R) of the stochastic component of the demand for 
reserves, X. Whether a second adjustment effort is required in the stop decision state depends 
both on the realization of the stochastic component of demand for reserves, X, and the level of 
the first adjustment that is assumed to have generated γA additional reservesTP5 PT which can be 
used in the stop decision state to support the exchange rate. This implies that a higher first 
period level of adjustment effort A increases the probability of a successfully completed 
stabilization. 
To summarize, Orphanides’ model is able to explain why delay may occur if 
policymakers believe that bad times are transitory and conditions will improve. For 
simplicity, the model works with reservation levels and assumes the crucial decision variable, 
R, to be stochastic. An interesting extension of the model might be to relax the assumption 
that the initial conditions facing the government during period t are independent of initial 
conditions faced in the past and government decisions made in previous periods. Relaxing this 
assumption would allow the government to improve initial conditions before attempting 
stabilization. Questionable is the assumption that the costs of inflation are totally independent 
of the level of inflation: even if the latter might approach infinity, the costs are still fixed at 
level c, an assumption with major implications when considering the stop decision state. 
Interestingly, the model suggests that reforms should be adopted mostly in good times, that is 
when the costs of stabilizing are low compared to the constant status quo utility. This 
contrasts most of the theoretical literature on delayed reform that relies on the so-called crisis 
hypothesis that states that reforms will only be adopted in perception of a crisis. 
 
                                                 
TP
5
PT Both in modeling adjustment efforts and the demand for reserves as including a random component Orphanides 
builds heavily on Dornbusch (1991) who deals with stabilization in a static set-up where a stabilization program 
will be implemented with probability one but has some ex ante probability of failure, so that credibility is always 
less than full. Dornbusch focuses on what factors raise or lower the probability of success of a stabilization 
program. 
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1.3 Delay of stabilization for signaling purposes 
Focusing on delayed stabilization of government debt Drudi and Prati (2000) suggest that 
accumulation of government debt may serve a strategic role: dependable, but not fully 
credible governments have incentives to accumulate the critical amount of debt that, by 
stabilizing, allows them to signal their type to avoid being confused with weak governments 
that default on debt repayments. According to this line of reasoning stabilization of the debt-
to-GDP ratio can be used to reassure markets of the sustainability of the fiscal regime to avoid 
otherwise increasing debt financing cost due to a high risk premium raising the interest rate. 
The model’s set-up is the following: With incomplete information concerning the type of 
government the public initially does not know whether a weak or a dependable government is 
in power. While dependable governments can precommit not to default on debt repayments, 
weak ones cannot. Consequently, without uncertainty a weak government would be unable to 
issue any debt at time zero since the public would anticipate its incentives to default. In the 
two-period model considered, a weak government defaults either in the first or second period 
depending on whether its strategy is to mimic the dependable type or not. Before the 
beginning of the first period the risk neutral public sets the first period gross interest rate, 1R , 
according the no-arbitrage condition: 1)1( =− ettR θ , where etθ denotes the default rate 
expected by investors in period t. The public’s belief on the probability that a dependable 
government is in charge can be interpreted as the “initial reputation” of the government in 
power. By the definition of incomplete information, the initial reputation is the same for both 
types of governments until beliefs are revised at the end of the first period based on observed 
policies. 
Given the first period interest rate, 1R , and an initial stock of debt, 1D , in the first period 
the government repays either the whole ( 01 =θ ) or a fraction ( 01 1 >≥θ ) of the initial debt 
plus interest payments, )1( 111 θ−RD , depending on its type and strategy, it spends a certain 
amount of government expenditures, g, and levies distortionary period one taxes, 1τ . In period 
two, the government repays either all ( 02 =θ ) or none ( 12 =θ ) of the debt plus interest 
payments, )1( 222 θ−RD , which is financed by distortionary taxes, 2τ . This results in the 
following government budget constraints for period one and two respectively: 
(4) 21111 )1( DgRD +=+− τθ  
(5) 2222 )1( τθ =−RD  
The government’s objective is to minimize the costs of distortionary taxation minus the 
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benefit of government expenditure that is assumed to be linear in the level of government 
spending: 
(6) ghh αττ −+ 21 )2/()2/( , 
where h denotes the marginal cost of taxation and α corresponds to the marginal benefit of 
government spending. 
Using this setup to investigate perfect Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies it is found that 
pooling or separating equilibria might prevail: In a separating equilibrium, a weak 
government will choose to fully default in period one ( 11 =Wθ ), and thus reveal itself by not 
repaying 11RD , since the cost of imitating the dependable government’s policies is larger than 
the benefit of issuing debt in period two. If this is not the case, a pooling equilibrium will 
prevail in which the weak government mimics the dependable government in period one and 
reveals its type only in period two by fully defaulting on debt and interest payments 22 RD  
( 12 =Wθ ). In contrast, a dependable government repays 11RD  and 22 RD  in both separating 
and pooling equilibria so that the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of the second 
period will always be lower for a dependable government than for a weak one. The following 
parameter values affect the trade-off between the costs of imitating and the benefit of issuing 
debt in period two faced by a weak government:  
- The higher the marginal benefit of government expenditure, α, the greater is the 
expenditure a weak government would like to finance in period one and the greater is 
the benefit of issuing debt between period one and two, 2D , since issuing debt is a 
means of avoiding high levels of distortionary taxation. 
- The higher the costs of marginal taxation, h, the higher are the weak government’s 
costs when imitating a dependable government’s policy. 
- The higher the initial stock of debt, 1D , the higher are the taxes levied by a dependable 
government in period one and the higher are the costs of imitating a dependable 
government. 
- The higher the initial reputation, the smaller is the risk premium and the higher are the 
incentives for a weak government to mimic a dependable government’s policies. 
Whether the economy will end up in a pooling or a separating equilibrium depends on the 
specific initial realizations and dynamics of these four parameters. Imagine the debt stock at 
the beginning of period one to be small and associated with a high initial reputation of the 
government. This combination induces only small interest payments, so that a dependable 
government will run a budget deficit as it considers the marginal benefit of government 
expenditure to be larger than the increase in interest cost induced by being confused with the 
weak type of government. Running a deficit, a weak government will mimic the dependable 
government – a pooling equilibrium will prevail. A budget deficit not only leads to a rising 
level of debt, but also to a worsening of reputation. Consequently, updating of beliefs on the 
type of government implies higher interest payments in period two. Defining stabilization as a 
stable debt-to-GDP ratio, a first situation that provides a rationale for delayed stabilization is 
characterized by risk premium and debt levels that are below a critical threshold in period one 
so that pooling equilibria prevail as no type of government has the incentive to tighten the 
fiscal regime in period one. 
Only when risk premium or debt levels exceed this critical threshold, separating 
equilibria6 will prevail as interest payments become so large that dependable governments 
want to signal their type in period one to profit from a higher credit rating and lower interest 
payments in period two. Since signaling requires primary surpluses or at least a balanced 
primary budget, stabilization results. Thinking of a horizon longer than two periods, even 
dependable governments find it optimal to delay the stabilization of the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
This is the case because dependable governments only have an incentive to tighten the fiscal 
regime when a sufficiently large stock of debt has been accumulated in past periods since it is 
under these circumstances that the signaling effect on credit ratings is larger.7
Given the specification of the government’s objective function, a driving force of Drudi 
and Prati’s signaling model of fiscal policy is that all types of government always have an 
incentive to run positive primary budget deficits as this is a way to avoid distortionary 
taxation. The signaling model presented above does give an explanation of why fiscal 
stabilization may be delayed, but it does not clarify whether fiscal stabilization can be 
considered welfare improving for the society as a whole. This contrasts the definition of 
stabilization used in this paper, namely that of stabilization being the adoption of a superior 
policy. 
10
                                                 
6 Two cases of separating equilibria exist: in the first case, debt plus interest maturing in period one is large 
enough to induce a dependable government to run a budget surplus. A weak government never mimics a budget 
surplus as it always prefers a higher level of expenditures. In the second case, parameter values are such that a 
dependable government would like to run a budget deficit due to a relatively low level of debt plus interest 
maturing (but not as small as in the pooling equilibrium). But not to be confused with a weak government, the 
dependable government has to cut its expenditures below the unconstrained optimal level by running a balanced 
primary budget. For this signaling strategy to be attractive for a dependable government the benefits of paying 
lower interest payments after signaling have to outweigh the cost of cutting expenditure in the previous period. 
Obviously, the incentives to signal are positively correlated with a poor initial reputation and with a high interest 
rate premium. 
7 Testing the theoretic predictions of their model econometrically, Drudi and Prati get affirmative results: the 
signaling power of primary surpluses seems to be largest when the debt stock is high and separating equilibria 
prevail. 
 
2. Political economy models of delayed stabilization 
 
In contrast to the models presented so far, the common feature of all political economy 
models explaining delayed stabilization is the crucial role they assign to conflict among 
heterogenous interest groups - an idea that was prominently laid down in Olson’s (1982) 
stagnation hypothesis and formalized by Benhabib and Rustichini (1996). A first class of 
political economy models that aims at offering an explanation for delayed stabilization relies 
on the “tragedy of the commons”: Assuming that interest groups have common access to the 
same pool of government resources Velasco (1998) models delayed stabilization as the result 
of a switch in interest groups’ wealth-dependent strategies, namely from appropriative to 
cooperative behavior, after a sufficiently large level of debt has been accumulated. 
A second category of models stresses that uncertainty regarding the distribution of 
individual gains and losses from reform can prevent socially beneficial reform from being 
implemented (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). Building on Fernandez and Rodrik’s static model 
Labán and Sturzenegger (1994a) endogenize the change in relative bargaining positions for 
different groups over time and model delayed stabilization as the outcome of a distributional 
conflict between two risk averse groups in the presence of post-stabilization payoff 
uncertainty and costly policy reversion. 
Conflict on how a cost imposed by reform is to be distributed among different social 
groups is the main element in a third class of models: Labán and Sturzenegger (1994b) 
modify the setup in Labán and Sturzenegger (1994a) by substituting the assumptions of risk 
aversion and post-stabilization payoff uncertainty for the existence of a cost of stabilization. 
Similarly, Alesina and Drazen’s (1991) war-of-attrition model makes use of distributional 
conflict on how the cost of stabilization is to be shared, but adds the further assumption of 
incomplete information concerning how much the other interest group suffers from the status 
quo of no reform. 
 
2.1 Blockade of policy change by interest groups 
The idea that powerful interest groups block socially beneficial policy change because it is 
not in their individual interest is prominently laid down in Olson’s (1982) stagnation 
hypothesis: some groups especially prospering economically in periods of economic success 
are also able to increase their political power. Having achieved positions of both economic 
and political power these groups clearly have an incentive to protect their gains by blocking 
(even socially beneficial) change that might be detrimental to them. A consequence of this 
11
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blockade will be economic stagnation or even decline. Although Olson’s The Rise and 
Decline of Nations is not primarily a theory of non-adoption of reforms, many of the models 
explaining non-adoption or delay of reform that are presented in the following rely heavily on 
the role of interest groups. 
Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) attempt to formalize Olson’s stagnation hypothesis in a 
common property model in which the interest groups’ optimal behavior (cooperation or 
appropriation) depends on the level of wealth that is taken to correspond to the economy’s 
capital stock. They show that for utility being linear in consumption and Cobb Douglas 
production technology with positive, but decreasing returns to capital, cooperative behavior 
can be sustained only if the capital stock is low. Since the marginal product of capital is high 
for low levels of the capital stock, capital is too valuable to risk in a poor economy: 
appropriative behavior would imply high consumption today at the cost of a small capital 
stock in the next period. Due to the additional assumption of a linear utility function 
cooperative behavior can no longer be sustained at higher levels of wealth. 
 
2.2 Common property model 
As Benhabib and Rustichini, in his approach to explaining delay of socially beneficial 
policy changes Velasco (1998) makes use of the idea of the “tragedy of the commons”: the 
fact that government resources are common property out of which interest groups can finance 
their preferred expenditures induces a level of government spending that exceeds revenues. 
As a consequence, government debt grows as time passes. Finally, delayed stabilization 
results nevertheless since interest groups’ optimal strategies are wealth-dependent: 
appropriative behavior is only optimal when government debt is low, while cooperative 
behavior inducing stabilization becomes optimal at high levels of debt. 
A major assumption of Velasco’s infinite horizon, discrete time model is that of 
fragmented fiscal policy making: the central fiscal authority is weak so that each of the 
interest groups can influence fiscal authorities to set net transfers on the group’s target item at 
some desired level. Consequently, economic policy reflects the sum of the interest groups’ 
behavior with respect to the common property, namely government wealth tb  that is assumed 
to be negative. The government budget constraint is: 
(7) ∑
=
+ −−+=
n
i
itttt gzyRbb
1
1 , 
where y is exogenous non-tax revenue per period and itg  is interest group’s i net transfer level 
at time t, that is subsidies the groups receives minus the taxes it pays.  stands for a 
deadweight loss incurred every period as long as interest groups behave appropriative, that is 
demand total net transfers that exceed government revenues. Appropriative behavior has to be 
financed by issuing debt at gross real interest rate R. Only if all groups agree to cooperate 
total transfers imply a constant level of debt and the deadweight loss disappears ( =0). Such 
a situation is referred to as stabilization. 
tz
tz
The n symmetric interest groups indexed by i determine their net transfer level  at time 
t subject to one constraint that results from the government budget constraint combined with a 
solvency condition guaranteeing that debt cannot grow without bound. An interest group’s 
transfer demand will only be granted by the government if its desired net transfer does not 
exceed 1/nth of the income flow from maximum wealth the government can have given any 
starting point , exogenous revenue y and an expected sequence of deadweight losses. If the 
desired net transfer violates this condition the interest group gets no net transfers at all. Every 
interest group maximizes its discounted utility that is logarithmically increasing in the 
received net transfer level subject to the evolution of , the constraint mentioned above and 
the other groups’ strategies. 
itg
tb
tb
To derive interest groups’ demand for transfers, Velasco focuses on Markov strategies in 
which net transfers are restricted to be functions of the payoff-relevant state variable  only. 
Calculating transfer demand functions yields the result that fragmented fiscal policy-making 
leads to a deficit bias: Appropriative behavior implies a total demand for transfers that 
exceeds revenues.
tb
8 Debt is accumulated and government wealth decreases over time. 
Calculating the interest groups’ lifetime utilities under appropriative as well as cooperative 
behavior by substituting the corresponding transfer levels  into the utility function one 
finds that for all  all groups would be better off in a cooperative equilibrium.
itg
tb
9 But this does 
only mean that cooperation is preferred to appropriation if all interest groups cooperate. To 
investigate whether the cooperative equilibrium can ever be sustained Velasco analyzes a 
Markov switching equilibrium in which each group plays trigger strategies: starting from a 
situation with cooperative behavior each interest group acts in a cooperative way as long as all 
others do, but switches to appropriative behavior in the next period as soon as another group 
13
                                                 
8 This is true for reasons parallel to the tragedy of the commons: since property rights are not defined over each 
group’s share of overall government wealth, any portion of government wealth not spent by one group will be 
spent by another group. Consequently, there are incentives to raise transfers above the collectively efficient rate. 
9 A cooperative equilibrium corresponds to a situation with a balanced budget in which each group receives 1/nth 
of exogenous income plus interest payments on government wealth. 
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deviates from cooperation in the current period. Obviously, under these assumptions a 
cooperative equilibrium can only be sustained if utility from stabilizing weakly exceeds utility 
from defecting: 
(8) )()( t
d
t
s bUbU ≥ . 
Given 0)( >td bU  there exists a unique level of government wealth, *tb , at which the utility 
from stabilizing and the utility from defecting are just equal. For tb >
*
tb , that is for low levels 
of government debt, utility is maximized from defecting and cooperation is not sustainable. 
Interest groups will play appropriative Markov strategies and debt will grow. After some time 
debt will be so high that tb <
*
tb  and utility associated with defection falls below that 
associated with stabilizing. This is the case as the elimination of the deadweight loss after 
stabilization becomes more attractive as debt grows and the payoff from defecting falls 
because the government becomes poorer and poorer. As a switch in fiscal policy occurs only 
after a sufficiently high level of debt has been accumulated Velasco’s model can convincingly 
explain delay of socially optimal policy changes. 
 
2.3 Uncertainty about individual post-stabilization payoffs 
 
2.3.1 Non-adoption of reform 
Uncertainty regarding the distribution of individual gains and losses from reform can 
prevent reform from being implemented even if it is common knowledge that it is socially 
optimal - this is the main idea of Fernandez and Rodrik’s (1991) model on non-adoption of 
reform. 
Imagine, for example, the following situation in which a welfare enhancing reform is 
decided upon by majority voting: it is common knowledge that the reform would create a 
group of losers and a group of winners. Assume for example, that 60% of the population is 
known to be better off with reform ex post, while 40% would be worse off. To introduce 
uncertainty it is assumed that, ex ante, only some of the winners of reform know for sure that 
they would benefit from reform being enacted: e.g. only two thirds of the 60% who would 
gain from reform, that is 40% of the total population, know that they would be among the 
beneficiaries from reform and consequently, would vote in favor of it. The remaining 60% of 
the total population are equally likely to belong to the remaining 20% of the whole population 
that will be winners from reform ex post. Those 60% will calculate their expected benefit 
from reform before deciding whether to vote in favor of or against it. Obviously, it depends 
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on the magnitudes of gains and losses whether their expected benefit from reform is positive 
or negative. For a negative expected benefit from reform, the presence of individual-specific 
uncertainty would induce a reform that benefits a majority of 60% ex post to be rejected ex 
ante. 
Fernandez and Rodrik formalize this argument using the example of trade liberalization in 
a two-sector model. Trade liberalization is assumed to lower wages in sector 1, while raising 
wages in sector 2. Workers who wish to move from the first to the second sector can do so, 
but only after incurring some cost that is not fully known ex ante. This cost of switching 
sectors is assumed to have two components: θ, a known general investment cost (e.g. in 
sector-specific human capital), and ic , an individual-specific cost (e.g. representing 
differences in individual ability and productivity), incurred only upon actually switching 
sectors. Only after the general investment θ has been made the individual-specific value of ic  
is revealed; before only the distribution of ic , f( ic ), is known. As individuals in the second 
sector profit from higher wages, they unambiguously support reform. In contrast to that, 
individuals in the first sector will only vote in favor of reform if they expect their net utility to 
rise after the adoption of reform. Since reforms are decided on by majority voting, adoption of 
reform requires at least half of the voters to expect a net benefit. 
Workers must make two decisions: first, whether to undertake the general investment θ 
and, only in case that this has been decided affirmatively, second, whether to actually switch 
sectors which requires incurring cost ic . Starting with the second decision workers’ optimal 
choice can be characterized as follows: A worker who has already invested θ will switch from 
sector 1 to sector 2 if the difference between wages in both sectors is larger than his individual 
ic . This defines a cut-off level of c, c~ , such that all workers with ic ≤  c~  will switch from 
the first to the second sector. c~ is defined by 
(9) 12 ~~~ wwc −=  
where jw~  is the equilibrium wage in sector j, j=1,2, after reform. 
Since workers are assumed to be identical ex ante, a risk-neutral worker in the first sector 
will incur the general investment cost θ if his expected net benefit from doing so is 
nonnegative, that is, if 
(10) 11
~
1
2
~~)]~(1[])]~([)(~)[~( wwcFcFcdccfwcF
c
c
≥−−+− ∫ − θ , 
where c  is the minimum value of all ic s and F(c) is the cumulative distribution function. The 
right hand side corresponds to the certain status quo income, the left hand side to the expected 
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benefit from incurring cost θ. 
What are the mechanisms used by Fernandez and Rodrik to make it possible that a reform 
with an expected benefit for society as a whole is not adopted? First, it is the assumption of 
majority voting that translates small differences in expected utility associated with adoption or 
non-adoption of reform into the binary decision whether to support or reject reform. 
Contrastingly, a mechanism that without causing any costs translates the intensity with which 
individuals favor or reject reform into policy outcomes (e.g. frictionless lobbying) would 
implement all socially optimal reforms. Second, the existence of a sector that benefits from 
reform with certainty is crucial.TP10 PT With the existence of only one sector all individuals were 
identical, and a socially beneficial reform would be adopted under majority voting since the 
expected benefit from reform would be the same (and nonnegative) for all individuals. Third, 
ex post compensation of the losers has to be ruled out to get the result that socially beneficial 
reform might not be adopted. To summarize, the two crucial ingredients driving the result 
that, even in the absence of risk aversion, a majority of voters opposes a reform ex ante that 
benefits a majority ex post are (i) heterogeneity between individuals in sector 1 and sector 2 
with respect to their expected benefit from reform and (ii) ex ante individual (but no 
aggregate) uncertainty of sector one individuals on whether they will be a gainer or loser 
from reform. 
Extending their model to a two period version, Fernandez and Rodrik establish a result 
that they call “status quo bias”: only if a reform is passed information is revealed on how 
individuals actually fare under reform.TP11 PT If a reform has proved to be unpopular only after 
being adopted while the majority’s ex ante beliefs were that reform would benefit them it 
could be reversed in a second vote. In contrast to that, if a reform is not passed no new 
information is revealed since the status quo is maintained. Thus, in a dynamic setting, a status 
quo bias arises since reforms that are initially rejected continue to be so while some reforms 
that have been implemented will be reversed. 
A crucial, but questionable assumption of the model stipulates that even reforms with 
large net gains create some losers. Especially in the context of macroeconomic stabilizations 
it is hard to imagine a socio-economic group that does not gain from stabilizing. The war-of-
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10
PT Cf. Drazen (2000), p.416. 
TP
11
PT This assumption might be too rigid since to some degree information concerning the distributional 
consequences of reform might be gained from experiences with similar reforms implemented abroad. An 
example is the German “Ökosteuer” that has been raised from 1999 on – a date at which 10 member states of the 
European Union had already established comparable taxes with similar distributional consequences. As the tax 
income is mainly used to reduce increases of pension insurance fees unemployed and retired people who do not 
pay the fee are the main losers. In contrast, employers in most branches of the economy are among the winners 
as higher energy costs are more than compensated by lower pension insurance fees (cf. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
21.4.2004, p.2). 
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attrition model presented in section 2.4.3 that focuses on distributional struggles arising from 
the possibility of an unevenly shared burden of reform offers an explanation why even 
reforms that virtually benefit everybody may be adopted only after some delay. Although the 
example presented in their model refers to trade reform Fernandez and Rodrik’s central 
argument can be applied to any reform that creates a distribution of gains and losses that is 
partially uncertain ex ante. The model’s focus on individual uncertainty certainly is an 
important and convincing contribution to the literature on why socially beneficial policy 
changes are not adopted, but it cannot explain why a policy change that has been rejected in 
the first place may still be enacted with delay. In order to address this point Labán and 
Sturzenegger (1994a) apply a dynamic version of the Fernandez-Rodrik model to inflation 
stabilization. 
 
2.3.2 Delayed stabilization 
Labán and Sturzenegger (1994a) model delayed stabilization as the result of a 
distributional conflict between two risk adverse groups in the presence of post-stabilization 
payoff uncertainty and costly policy reversion. Compared to the Fernandez-Rodrik model, 
they add time dependency by introducing learning in how to use a financial adaptation 
technology. This technology is only available to the rich and allows them to protect their 
assets against inflation taxation. Additionally, it increases the rate of inflation and 
concentrates the burden of inflation on the poor, which in turn induces the poor to accept 
conditions for stabilization that they were not willing to accept before. 
In the model, per period endowment levels of the two types of agents, rich and poor ones 
(represented by the indices r and p), are re and pe respectively. Before stabilization the poor 
receive a per period transfer g financed by distortionary taxation levied on both agents. As the 
rich have access to a tax shielding technology that allows them to optimally reduce the base 
over which a distortionary tax is collected a rich agent can decide which share f of his 
endowment he wants to protect against taxation. Agents’ per period consumption equals their 
net endowment. The utility function is assumed to be a constant absolute risk aversion utility 
function, with risk aversion coefficient γ>0. 
In the pre-stabilization economy, the government budget constraint is given by 
(11) )(
1 tprt
t Feeg −++= π
π
, 
where tF  denotes the aggregate level of tax shielding chosen by the rich in period t and 
represents the share of their total endowment that is exempt from distortionary taxation. The 
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tax rate )1/( ππ +  is endogenous and depends on the aggregate level of tax evasion, where π  
is the inflation tax. Using the financial adaptation technology for an amount tf  a rich agent 
faces a cost of ),( tt Kfc , where ∑ −== ztzt FK 10  denotes the aggregate level of knowledge 
regarding financial adaptation accumulated until the beginning of period t. Due to a learning 
process an increase in the stock of experience on how to use financial adaptation technologies 
is assumed to reduce the marginal cost of engaging in tax evasion ( Kc <0). Furthermore, 
0>fc , 0>ffc  and 0<fKc . Before stabilization the poor pay a proportion tθ of distortionary 
taxation in period t and the rich bear a fraction (1- tθ ), where 
(12) 
trp
p
t Fee
e
−+=θ . 
Since inflation has distortionary effects, it generates welfare losses that are represented by an 
additive reduction in the endowment of each agent equal to )(πφ , with )(' πφ >0 and )('' πφ >0. 
For simplicity, it is assumed that post-stabilization taxes fall completely on the rich.  
At the beginning of each period agents decide whether to stabilize or not. Stabilization is 
defined as a fiscal reform that balances the budget via a combination of spending cuts and 
increased taxation and eliminates the distortions associated with inflation. Stabilization can 
only be enacted if both types of agents agree. The model’s only source of uncertainty is 
instrument uncertainty in an environment otherwise characterized by perfect information, i.e. 
agents do not know a priori how effective the government will be in enforcing the agreed 
upon stabilization program. This uncertainty is only resolved after program implementation. 
Expected post-stabilization transfers are rtegE =)~( , where t denotes the tax rate after 
stabilization. Instrument uncertainty is conceptualized by assuming that the amount of post-
stabilization transfers equals g~ , where α−= rteg~  with α  being a random variable with zero 
conditional mean and variance 2ασ . Thus, certainty equivalent transfer levels after 
stabilization, g , can be denoted by 
(13) 
2
2
αγσ−≅ rsp teg  and   )2(
2
αγσ+−≅ rsr teg , 
where 2/2αγσ  is the risk premium both agents are willing to pay to avoid uncertainty 
associated with the stabilization outcome, i.e. for a situation in which the poor receive 
s
pg and 
the rich pay 
s
rg  with probability one.  
The rich are assumed to maximize the discounted sum of their utility by choosing optimal 
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levels of financial adaptation 1f  and 2f . What can be learned by examining the maximization 
problem’s first order condition for a situation in which stabilization is not achieved in either 
period? It reveals that the given economy is characterized by a positive and increasing 
equilibrium level of financial adaptation, an endogenously increasing level of inflation and a 
regressive impact of financial adaptation, 12 θθ > . Since we are considering a two period 
economy, delay exists whenever stabilization is attempted in the second period but is not an 
equilibrium in the first period. When will this be the case? The poor and the rich will want to 
stabilize whenever their utility with stabilization is greater than that without stabilization. 
Thus, for stabilization in the second period to be feasible it must be the case that: 
(14) ))1()(()2/( 22
2
2 geUeteU prp θπφγσα −+−≥−+  and  
(15) )),()1()(()2/( 2
*
222
2
2 KfcgeUeteU rrr −−−−≥−− θπφγσα . 
Equations (14) and (15) implicitly define the minimum expected tax rate that the poor are 
willing to accept, pt2 , and the maximum expected tax rate that the rich are willing to pay, rt2 . 
Only when the latter is higher than the former, pr tt 22 > , there is a non-empty set of tax rates  
in period 2 that both the rich and the poor are willing to accept and stabilization will be 
feasible. Evaluating this condition given that U(.) is a monotonic, strictly increasing function, 
the existence of such an agreement area requires 
(16) ),()(2 2
*
22
2 Kfc+≤ πφγσα . 
Delayed stabilization not only requires rt2  being higher than pt2 , but also pr tt 11 <  to 
guarantee that stabilization does not already take place in the first period. Similarly as above, 
the first period set of possible agreements to stabilize is empty if 
(17) ),()(2 1
*
11
2 Kfc+> πφγσα . 
Equations (16) and (17) show that there will only be incentives to stabilize when the 
economy-wide gains from stabilization (end of overall distortions and money wasted by 
investments in the financial adaptation technology) at least compensate the risk premium of 
engaging in stabilization with uncertain outcome. It may be counterintuitive that stabilization 
is not achieved in the first period if everybody anticipates that it will be in the second, but in 
the given set-up with risky stabilization this result is reasonable: while inflation is low, its 
costs will not be large enough to justify engaging in a process with risky outcomes. But as 
inflation endogenously increases every period, the poor’s relative position progressively 
deteriorates so that they are willing to agree to stabilize at a lower level of expected transfers 
 
20
(formally, pp tt 12 < ). At some point further delays no longer constitute an equilibrium and 
stabilization is enacted.  
To summarize, for delayed stabilization to be optimal under the conditions established in 
equations (16) and (17) the model makes use of two crucial assumptions: (i) the combination 
of risk aversion and uncertainty regarding post-stabilization payoffs and (ii) the existence of 
distributional conflict as this is the only reason for the use of the financial adaptation 
technology that only redistributes income from the poor to the rich without reducing the total 
amount of resources paid as inflation tax. Without the use of financial adaptation inflation 
would not increase over time and the optimal decision would be to either stabilize in period 
one or never, ruling out delay. 
A comparison of Labán and Sturzenegger’s model of uncertainty with deterioration with 
Orphanides’ model of optimal waiting might be worthwhileTP12 PT: in the optimal waiting model 
the status quo utility is constant and the decision whether to stabilize or not depends on the 
benefit of reform compared to its costs. In contrast to that, the uncertainty model compares the 
net benefit of stabilization to the status quo of no reform and the driving force is the 
deterioration of the status quo. In the uncertainty model stabilization results since utility 
associated with the status quo is falling even faster than relative costs of reform are rising. 
This results in the major difference that in the optimal waiting model stabilization occurs 
when its costs are low, while in the uncertainty model stabilization occurs when its costs are 
high compared to its benefits. 
 
2.4 Distributional conflict 
 
2.4.1 Distributional conflict and costly stabilization 
A closely related approach to explaining delayed stabilization is presented in Labán and 
Sturzenegger (1994b). The major difference to the set-up described in section 2.3.2 is that the 
assumptions of risk aversion and post-stabilization payoff uncertainty are substituted for the 
existence of a cost of stabilization, Q, that has to be paid by both groups if stabilization is 
implemented. All other central features remain the same. The model described in section 2.3.2 
already shared the ingredient of distributional conflict with Alesina and Drazen’s war-of-
attrition model outlined in section 2.4.3. Dropping the assumptions of risk aversion and post-
stabilization payoff uncertainty in favor of a cost of stabilization is a further step towards the 
class of war-of-attrition models. 
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PT Cf. Drazen (2000), p. 421f. 
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 How does the slightly changed specification of the model influence its results? Since the 
set-up now incorporates an infinite horizon the date of stabilization can be specified by the 
smallest *Tt ≥ , where T* solves 
(18) QKfc TTT 2)1(),()(2 ***
* δπφ −=+ . 
The left hand side of equation (18) can be shown to be increasing in t. Parallel to (16) in the 
first version of the model, stabilization will take place in the first period in which the 
agreement area for a transfer level both the poor and the rich are willing to accept becomes 
nonnegative. The date of stabilization depends only on aggregate costs and benefits of 
delaying stabilization (and not on the distributional parameter θ) where the benefits stem from 
the fact that discounting with factor δ reduces the relative costs of stabilizing tomorrow 
compared to the costs of stabilizing today. Consequently, the timing of stabilization is 
essentially a decision of when to pay the adjustment costs. 
To summarize, in the second version of their model Labán and Sturzenegger show that, 
even in the presence of fully informed and rational agents, also the interplay between 
stabilization costs and distributional conflict may generate delay as well as change the 
conditions for stabilization through time as rising inflation worsens the relative bargaining 
power of the poor. 
 
2.4.2 Cycles of inflation 
An interesting extension of the model outlined above that points at further dynamics after 
stabilization is provided by Mondino, Sturzenegger and Tommasi (1996): if dealing with 
financial adaptation is expensive, stabilization will lead to remonetization. Remonetization 
will bring the economy back into the initial state so that groups demand transfers again and 
inflation resumes. 
The set-up is very similar to that described above: there is distributional conflict due to the 
existence of a financial adaptation technology, but neither costs of stabilization nor post-
stabilization payoff uncertainty exist. Instead both groups make use of the financial adaptation 
technology and may demand subsidies that have to be financed by an inflation tax. The 
crucial assumptions are the following: in general, there is a cost of operating with financial 
alternatives, namely  
(19) 
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      (20) ]},min[,,...2,,0{1 eJffJJf ttt +∈+ ,  
and can be reduced for free. The cost of inflation π  is απ . 
Different kinds of equilibria can be shown to exist depending on the marginal cost of 
inflation, α, and the marginal cost of using financial adaptation mechanisms, τ. Inflation cycle 
equilibria for example are the result of low marginal costs of inflation and low initial levels of 
financial adaptation since when faced with this situation groups demand subsidies. Being 
aware that subsidies have to be financed via inflation taxes groups make use of financial 
adaptation. As a consequence, the process of inflation and the use of financial adaptation 
deepen over time. At some point further subsidies entail inflation costs and financial 
adaptation costs that are higher than the subsidies’ benefit so that groups will agree to 
stabilize and inflation will go down to zero. Next period, costs of inflation will be low due to 
remonetarization, groups will demand subsidies again and the whole cycle restarts. No 
inflation equilibria arise for sufficiently large costs of inflation. Equilibria with constant low 
inflation result when the costs of financial adaptation are so high that it is preferable for 
individuals to bear the full inflation tax rather than to operate in foreign currency etc.. 
Delayed (permanent) stabilization as in Alesina and Drazen’s (1991) model is a further kind 
of equilibrium that exists given the assumption of full memory in the financial adaptation 
technology, i.e. the assumption that return to every level of financial adaptation previously 
attained is costless. Delayed stabilization results because, once stabilization has been 
achieved, there is never an incentive to demand subsidies again since this would automatically 
lead to the maximum amount of financial adaptation previously exercised. 
The contribution of Mondino et al. to the existing literature clearly is integrating the 
possibility of policy inaction, delay and policy cycles in one single framework without relying 
on uncertainty or asymmetric information. 
 
2.4.3 Distributional conflict and asymmetric information 
In contrast to that, asymmetric information is one important ingredient of Alesina and 
Drazen’s (1991) model that aims at explaining delayed stabilization as a war of attritionTP13 PT 
between interest groups with conflicting distributional objectives. In their model, it is 
common knowledge that stabilization, basically eliminating budget deficits, benefits each 
                                                 
TP
13
PT Although not explicitly mentioned by the authors, the idea of a war of attrition is likely to be inspired by what 
Hirschman (1985) calls the tug-of-war thesis or social-conflict theory of inflation, that is “(t)he explanation of 
inflation in terms of social conflict between groups, each aspiring to a greater share of the social product” (p.57) 
in a situation in which “a social group holds enough power or influence to command additional wealth and 
income for itself (or to escape participation in some loss that is suffered by the economy), but not enough to do 
so in a permanent way through a definite transfer” (p.66). 
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group by putting an end to utility reducing distortions. Despite widespread agreement on the 
socially beneficial nature of stabilization there is disagreement on how the burden induced by 
the policy change is to be shared. Consequently, a war of attrition arises in which each group 
tries to wait the other groups out hoping to shift the burden of stabilization elsewhere. Delay 
ends and stabilization finally occurs when one group realizes that it is relatively weaker 
compared to the other group and agrees to bear a larger share of the burden of stabilization.TP14 PT 
As Drazen (2000: 432) points out, this view of reform is based on the observation that reform 
is a public good: groups can benefit from it without bearing any costs. 
Alesina and Drazen describe an economy in which the government is running a positive 
deficit (inclusive of debt service) due to the failure of two interest groups indexed by i, i=1,2, 
to agree upon a stabilization program. Without an agreement to stabilize only distortionary 
taxes are available for financing government expenditures g and revenue from those taxes is 
insufficient to fully cover government expenditures: a fraction γ of government expenditure is 
covered by distortionary taxation τ, and a fraction 1-γ is financed via debt. All payoffs are 
discounted with a constant interest r, r>0, and debt bears the same interest rate r. Thus, both 
the level of taxes and the level of debt are rising as time passes. The fact that taxes before 
stabilization are distortionary induces a per period utility loss that is assumed to differ across 
the two interest groups representing the whole population. This utility loss is captured by the 
interest group specific realization of the parameter iθ : )()( ttK ii τθ= , where iθ  is drawn from 
a distribution F(θ) with support [θ ,θ ]. iθ  is assumed to be private information: the exact 
value of iθ  is only known to an interest group itself whereas the other group only knows the 
distribution F(θ). Stabilization occurs as soon as one group concedes, i.e. agrees to pay a share 
α>1/2 of the cost of stabilization. Stabilization has two implications: first, stabilization 
implies a move away from distortionary means of taxation ( 0)( =tKi ). In this respect, all 
groups clearly benefit from stabilization. Second, stabilization is defined as an increase in 
taxes sufficient to yield zero deficits and consequently, a constant level of debt and taxes. 
While before stabilization each interest group paid half of distortionary taxes non-
distortionary taxes are shared unequally with the loser bearing a share of α>1/2, the winner 1-
α. The fraction α is not bargained upon, but exogenous. It is assumed to represent the degree 
of polarization of a given society with a value of α close to one representing a highly 
polarized society. It is exactly this unequal sharing of the burden of reform or, put in other 
                                                 
TP
14
PT A very similar version of Alesina and Drazen’s war-of-attrition model in which inflation appears explicitly, 
but there is no explicit evolution of debt is presented by Drazen and Grilli (1993) who find exactly the same type 
of equilibrium as in the original model. 
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words, the fact that interest groups benefit from stabilization to a differential extent 
(combined with the assumption of asymmetric information concerning the opponent’s utility 
cost of distortionary taxation) that will provide the incentive to delay reform. 
To underline that there is no need of an increasing level of debt (implying rising taxes and 
thus, an increase of disutility from distortions) to induce stabilization and to keep functional 
forms as simple as possible, the following more formal presentation of Alesina and Drazen’s 
model deviates from the original one as γ is set equal to one and debt is assumed to be zero. 
This implies that both taxes before and after stabilization, )(tτ and )(Tτ  respectively, equal 
government expenditures g : gTt == )()( ττ . Neglecting constant income, flow utility of 
group i before stabilization reflects both the effects of taxes paid and the utility loss due to 
distortionary taxation: 
(21) gtu ii )2/1()( θ+−= . 
Discounted life time utilities of loser and winner from the date of stabilization onward, 
LV and WV , simply correspond to constant flow utilities after stabilization divided by r: 
(22)  
r
gV L α−=  and 
r
gV W )1( α−−= .  
Thus, if stabilization is implemented at date T, lifetime utilities of the winner and of the loser 
are given by 
(23) ∫ −− += T jrTrxij TVedxeuTU 0 )()(  with { }LWj ,∈ .  
Each group maximizes expected present utility by the choice of a date to concede (where 
conceding brings about stabilization via the agreement that the conceding group bears a 
higher share α of taxes after stabilization). Expected utility as a function of one’s chosen 
concession time iT  is the sum of the lifetime utility of the loser, )( i
L TU , multiplied by the 
probability that the opponent has not yet given up at one’s chosen time of concession, iT , and 
the lifetime utility of the winner, )( i
W TU , multiplied by the probability that the opponent 
concedes first at any date X for all X iT≤ . Thus, if H(T) denotes the distribution of the 
opponent’s optimal time of concession and h(t) the associated density function, the 
maximization problem can be put as follows:  
(24) 
))(1()(max iiT THTEUi
−= ∫ ∫ ==−− ++i iiT TxxiLrTrxi TVedxeu0 0))(( ( ∫ −− +x wrxrzi xVedzeu0 )( ) dxxh )( . 
As 1-H(T(θ))=F(θ), we can now use equation (24) to find a symmetric Nash equilibrium in 
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which each group’s concession behavior is described by the same function T(θ). The 
following first order condition implicitly defines a group’s optimal concession behavior T(θ):  
(25) 
rTF
f
)`(
)12(
)(
)(2/1 θ
α
θ
θαθ −−=−+ .  
(A more comprehensive derivation of the equilibrium condition independent of functional 
assumptions is given in appendix A.) As in the basic war-of-attrition model from biologyTP15 PT the 
optimal time of concession is determined by the equilibrium condition that the cost of waiting 
another instant to concede just equals the expected benefit from waiting. The left hand side of 
equation (25) stands for the costs of waiting another instant to concede, while the right hand 
side represents the expected gain from waiting another instant to concede, namely the 
probability that the opponent concedes, 
)`(
1
)(
)(
θθ
θ
TF
f− , multiplied by the gain if the opponent 
concedes, r/)12( −α . At each given date, information is revealed and each agent revises his 
beliefs about the other player’s type. However, this process is predictableTP16 PT in the sense that 
the conditional probability that the other agent concedes given that he still resists in a specific 
moment can be computed before the start of the game. To guarantee that concession occurs in 
finite time with probability one it has to be assumed that 2/1−>αθ , that is that the marginal 
costs of waiting are positive for all possible realizations of θ. Solving equation (25) for T`(θ), 
assuming θ to be uniformly distributed on ],[ θθ  and integration using the method of partial 
fractions and the initial boundary condition 0)( =θT  yields the optimal time of concession 
function, 
(26) )ln
2/1
)2/1(ln
)2/1(
)12()( θθ
θθ
αθ
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αθ
αθ −
−−−+
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−=
r
T ,TP17 PT 
that is decreasing in θ. Given the optimal concession time as a function of θ, T(θ), the date of 
stabilization in a war of attrition with two interest groups corresponds to the minimum value 
of T, that is the optimal time of concession of the group with higher cost θ.  
An extremely valuable and interesting aspect of Alesina and Drazen’s war-of-attrition 
model is that it allows for comparative statics on how different values of observable 
parameters characterizing economies affect the expected date of stabilization. Ceteris paribus, 
stabilization is hastened  
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PT See Riley (1980). 
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16
PT See Bliss and Nalebuff (1984), p.5. 
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17
PT For the derivation of equation (26) see appendix B. 
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(i) for a higher value of γ, that is, for the specified function of utility loss, if a 
greater fraction of the pre-stabilization deficit is financed via distortionary 
taxation, 
(ii) if the costs of living in an unstabilized economy, iK , increase for an 
unchanged distribution of iθ , 
(iii) in a politically less polarized society, i.e. for a smaller value of α. 
Last, assume that the rich suffer less from pre-stabilization distortions: θ`(y)<0 and θ``(y)<0. 
A larger inequality of income due to a mean-preserving spread of income - to be able to 
maintain the assumption of unknown relative positions in the income distribution - that keeps 
the expected minimum income constant implies a later expected date of stabilization. 
What are the crucial factors the war-of-attrition model makes use of to explain delay of a 
socially beneficial policy? First, as a single agent would decide to stabilize immediately being 
aware that he himself had to bear the costs of stabilization sooner or later, the existence of 
interest groups and their ex post heterogeneity (introduced by the parameter α that reflects the 
unequal sharing of the burden of reform) is a prerequisite for the distributional conflict that 
induces delay. Second, there is also a need for uncertainty about the other group’s costs 
associated with the status quo: if a group would be sure that it would suffer most from the 
status quo, its best response would be to give up immediately. Third, as in the uncertainty 
model, the impossibility of ex post compensation from winners to losers is crucial to the 
results since full compensation would be equivalent to the burden of reform being shared 
equally (α=1/2). With α=1/2, both groups would pay the same amount of taxes before and 
after stabilization (as )()( Tt ττ = ) and the only change induced by stabilization would be the 
end of utility reducing distortions. Consequently, delaying stabilization would never be 
optimal. 
Thus, both Alesina and Drazen’s war-of-attrition model and Fernandez and Rodrik’s 
uncertainty about benefits from reform model make use of the heterogeneity and uncertainty, 
though in different ways. While in the war-of-attrition model heterogeneity refers to 
heterogeneity after stabilization, namely the unequal distribution of the costs of reform, in the 
uncertainty model heterogeneity of agents before stabilization is decisive in that it is common 
knowledge that there exist some (and never all) agents that benefit from reform with 
probability one. In the war-of-attrition model, uncertainty enters as uncertainty concerning the 
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cost of waiting of the other group, while in Fernandez and Rodrik’s model uncertainty refers 
to uncertainty about the individual-specific benefits from reform.TP18 PT TP19 PT 
Alesina and Drazen’s war-of-attrition model has been extended in various ways as will be 
presented below: by adding an exogenous deadline, beyond which all players suffer a penalty 
in case of no agreement (Carré, 2000), by endogenizing the distribution of stabilization costs 
through a bargaining game (Hsieh, 2000), and by adding foreign aid (Casella and 
Eichengreen, 1996, see chapter IV).TP20 PT 
 
2.4.3.1 Inclusion of an exogenous deadline 
Carré’s (2000) contribution to the literature on war-of-attrition models is the introduction 
of an exogenous deadline to study how such a deadline affects the date of stabilization. TP21 PT The 
idea of a deadline is implemented as follows: at the beginning of the game it is decided that if 
no agent has conceded before time MT , all agents will bear an extra per period cost β for the 
rest of the game. Furthermore, it is assumed that if both agents concede precisely at the same 
date, the cost of reform is evenly split, that is α=1/2. 
What does taking a deadline into account imply for the equilibrium date of stabilization in 
the war-of-attrition model? Basically, a deadline induces a probability mass at point MT  in the 
distribution function H(.) of optimal conceding time: a player who, without the existence of 
any penalty, would have conceded right after MT , at ε+MT  with 0→ε , now has an 
incentive to concede precisely at MT  if the cost of missing the deadline is larger than the gain 
from waiting in the hope that the other agent will give up first. Let Wθ  denote the type who is 
                                                 
TP
18
PT A more comprehensive comparison of the war-of-attrition and the uncertainty model is presented in Drazen 
(2000), p.432. 
TP
19
PT Drazen (1996) presents a simplified framework that encompasses both the war-of-attrition model and Labán 
and Sturzenegger’s uncertainty about individual specific benefit approach to delayed reform by representing the 
decision whether to support or implement a reform program or not as a decision of whether to purchase a good 
or not. While the simplified set-up allows for comparison of the two complementary models with each other as 
well as with other models, it tends to oversimplify so that the models clearly loose a lot of their richness.  
TP
20
PT Inspired by Alesina and Drazen’s explanation of delayed stabilization, Spolaore (2003) emphasizes that 
delayed stabilization occurs specifically in consensus systems, but not in other types of government. Spolaore 
aims at predicting the patterns of adjustment policies in response to shocks in different systems of government 
based (i) on the degree of political fragmentation measured by the number of agents involved in decision 
making, and (ii) on agents’ magnitude of conflict in choosing a policy instrument, a concept similar to the 
parameter α representing the polarization of society in Alesina and Drazen’s model. The different government 
systems - consensus, cabinet and checks-and-balances systems - are characterized by the way control over 
adjustment policies is allocated across agents. All three government systems can be shown to suffer from 
inefficient reaction to adjustment requirements, but delayed policy response arises only in consensus systems in 
which each group is assumed to be able to veto policy change (as is the case in Alesina and Drazen’s war-of-
attrition model). 
TP
21
PT One among many examples motivating such a deadline is the role of the Maastricht Treaty in the process of 
European integration: countries that had not reduced their budget deficit by the date specified in the treaty were 
not allowed to participate in the Monetary Union which can be considered costly for those countries. 
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just indifferent between conceding at time MT  and time MT +ε. Thus, if Mθ  is the type that 
optimally concedes at MT  without the threat of a penalty, with a penalty there are types i with 
costs MiW θθθ <≤  who will concede earlier, at MT . As a consequence the probability that 
stabilization occurs at date MT  is now a strictly positive. This in turn induces agents who 
would have conceded right before MT  in the game without any penalty to wait until date MT  
in the hope to share the burden of reform equally as is the case in a split outcome. The type 
who is just indifferent between losing the game when conceding at )~(θT < MT  and waiting 
until MT , which implies bearing distortion costs for this period in the hope to share the burden 
of reform equally, is characterized by costs of θ~ .TP22 PT  
Wθ Mθ θ~
T~
MT
θ
T
 
Figure II.2 describes the distribution function of equilibrium conceding times in both the 
game with and without a deadline, the green and the red line respectively. The graphs 
underline that the major difference between the model with a penalty and the basic war-of-
attrition model is the existence of a mass point at MT  since all agents with parameter θ 
                                                 
TP
22
PT Along a similar line of reasoning, an increase in the costs of not having stabilized on time, β, induces a 
decrease of Wθ  (due higher costs when not stabilizing on time) and an increase of θ~  (due to the higher 
probability to benefit from the split solution). 
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between Wθ  and θ~ choose the same date of conceding, MT . On the one hand, the part of the 
green graph left from the red one shows that the release of information is accelerated by the 
existence of a penalty, on the other hand in equilibrium there exists a period of total inertia 
before the deadline, i.e. a period in which nobody (whatever type) wants to concede, namely 
[,~] MTTT ∈ . In sum, the existence of a penalty induces some agents to advance and some 
agents to delay their decision to stabilize. Consequently, the implications of a credible 
announcement of an enforceable deadline for the exact date of stabilization (and for the 
welfare of a society) depend on the realization of types θ. 
 
2.4.3.2 Endogenizing the distribution of stabilization costs 
Hsieh’s (2000) modification of Alesina and Drazen’s war-of-attrition model allows the 
distribution of adjustment costs, the shares α, to be determined endogenously by a bargaining 
game rather than being exogenously fixed. It is assumed that groups with high income lose 
more from delay than groups with fewer resources and hence will agree to bear a larger share 
of stabilization costs. As the income of the group who accepts or rejects the offered share is 
private information, delay serves as a screening device in separating types: delay in the 
implementation of reform allows the party making offers to discriminate between groups that 
can bear a large burden of stabilization costs and groups that cannot. Although all groups lose 
from delayed stabilization, they bargain over how the stabilization costs are to be shared since 
there is no way other than delay how a group with small resources can credibly prove that it 
has small resources. 
In Hsieh’s two period modelTP23 PT of conflict, workers and capitalists bargain over the 
distribution of the tax burden after stabilization with the workers being agenda setter. While 
the workers’ income is common knowledge, only the distribution of the capitalists’ income is 
known, its exact value is private information of the capitalists. Thus, the capitalists’ income 
corresponds to the type iθ  in Alesina and Drazen’s model. In the first period, workers propose 
that capitalists pay a fraction 1α  of the higher non-distortionary taxes needed to close the 
budget deficit. If the capitalists accept, both groups receive their income, pay the agreed upon 
shares, stabilization takes place and the game ends. If the capitalists reject the offer, the 
economy slips into the second period in which hyperinflation prevails that devaluates both 
groups’ incomes. As it is assumed that the lower is the capitalists’ income the less they suffer 
from no stabilization, by rejecting the workers’ first period offer capitalists can signal that 
                                                 
TP
23
PT Extending the bargaining game to an infinite horizon would allow determining the expected length of delay 
without changing the fundamental nature of the game. 
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their income is below some critical level so that the offer was not good enough to induce 
agreement. If the first period offer is rejected workers update their beliefs about the 
capitalists’ income and offer a lower share 2α  in the second period since workers suffer from 
pre-stabilization distortions. It is the expectation of a better offer that induces delay in 
stabilizing the economy. If the capitalists accept the workers’ second period offer, each group 
gets its income adjusted for the effects of hyperinflation minus the share of higher, non-
distortionary taxes it pays. If capitalists reject the workers’ second period offer, the game ends 
without stabilizing and payoffs are zero for both groups. 
To conclude, Hsieh shows that the existence of delayed stabilization carries over to a war-
of-attrition model in which the distribution of the burden of reform is endogenized. In a setup 
characterized by private information on how much a group suffers from the status quo, delay 
serves as a screening device and is the only way how a group can reduce the share of a 
reform’s burden it has to bear. 
 
III. Does foreign aid delay stabilization? 
 
Building on the models explaining delayed stabilization processes that have been 
presented in the previous chapter, this chapter analyzes the implications of foreign aid in the 
context of these models: Is the provision of foreign aid predicted to have any effect on the 
expected date of stabilization? If this is the case, will the provision of foreign aid accelerate 
or, as postulated by the so-called crisis hypothesis, delay stabilization? Before turning to these 
questions it will be pointed out that the way foreign aid is typically modeled by economists is 
a more adequate formalization of the currently discussed instrument of budget support than of 
more traditional ways of development financing such as project aid. 
 
1. Budget support 
As has been pointed out in chapter I there is widespread agreement that the record of 
foreign aid programs launched after World War II to alleviate poverty and to stimulate growth 
is clearly disappointing.TP24 PT One reaction to this finding is a discussion on the proper way to 
disseminate aid: a topic figuring prominently at the current international development agenda 
is the provision of aid in form of budget support instead of traditional project or sector aid. 
                                                 
TP
24
PT See for example Boone (1996) or Burnside and Dollar (1997). 
The list of potential advantages of budget support is long25: as budget support induces a 
pooling of donor support and requires a better coordination instead of competition among 
donors external aid can be used more efficiently. Furthermore, sustainability can be increased 
as centralized information on the amount of available resources offers better possibilities to 
finance maintenance and to avoid a situation in which poor information on donor projects 
inflates sector budgets beyond the level that can be sustained in the long run. In contrast to 
project and sector approaches, budget support can save substantial amounts of transaction 
costs and is automatically embedded in the broader macroeconomic environment. Granting 
foreign aid in form of budget support also promotes a more transparent and predictable donor 
financing that leaves room for firmer budget and expenditure planning. A political advantage 
of budget support is that by increasing transparency it makes governments more accountable 
to their own people. Compared to a multiplicity of stand-alone projects staffed with overseas 
experts budget support can strengthen capacity and institution building. Last, but not least 
budget support stresses the idea of partnership as it promotes poverty reduction based on a 
country’s own strategy and strengthens local ownership. In sum, the claim is that, for a variety 
of reasons, budget support is an extremely effective and favorable way to distribute aid. First 
studies evaluating the effects of budget support confirm that many of the promised advantages 
can be realized when budget support is designed carefully.26
Nevertheless the share of international development financing that is spent in form of 
budget support is still quite low, though rising. At EU level, in the years 2001 and 2002 an 
average of about 10% of gross bilateral Official Development Aid was spent in form of 
budget support, 70% on project aid.27 One explanation of the relatively low share of budget 
support certainly is lack of donor’s confidence in that external funds will be used as agreed 
upon and that priorities in poverty reduction strategies will be adhered to. In practice, this fear 
is addressed by making the provision of budget support conditional on the fact that the 
recipient country has worked out a poverty reduction strategy that has been accepted by the 
Worldbank or the IMF. Furthermore, governments must offer assurances that they will pursue 
sound fiscal management, which obviously requires an institutional capacity that cannot be 
taken for granted in many developing countries.  
31
                                                 
25 Compare for example Development Cooperation Directorate / Development Assistance Committee / Task 
Force on Donor Practices (2001). 
26 See Oxford Policy Management and Overseas Development Institute (2002) and Institute of Development 
Studies (2002) on budget support programs launched by the United Kingdom and Switzerland, respectively. 
27 See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/24/1875307.gif. 
 
The existing literature on budget support mainly deals with the prerequisites of successful 
budget support28 or consists of evaluation studies. The focus of this paper differs as it 
investigates the impact of budget support on the timing of macroeconomic stabilizations. This 
is done by analyzing the incorporation of budget support in the models of delayed 
stabilization reviewed in chapter two – at the cost of related literature.29 For this, budget 
support will be modeled as unconditional foreign aid accruing directly to the government 
budget30: Although budget support is, for good reasons, granted only if criteria like sound 
fiscal management and the existence of convincing and accepted poverty reduction strategies 
are met, budget support does not obey the rules of traditional conditionality, that is, making 
aid conditional on countries implementing a specific set of macroeconomic policies. The 
terms budget support and (unconditional) foreign aid will be used synonymously. 
 
2. Theoretical literature 
What are the consequences of the provision of budget support on the timing of 
macroeconomic stabilizations? Some of the models discussed in chapter two have already 
been extended by incorporating foreign aid modeled as a cash transfer to the recipient 
government. This trivial way of modeling foreign aid is certainly not appropriate for 
investigating the effects of traditional project aid that is typically organized in a decentralized 
way and often reflects the donor country’s preferences on how to spend additional money in 
developing countries (as, for example, the large variety of environmental project underlines). 
In contrast to that, modeling the effect of foreign aid to be a higher level of government 
spending captures the idea of general budget support quite exactly. 
In the following, models will be categorized according to whether they predict the impact 
of budget support on the date of stabilization to be delay, acceleration or to be not existent at 
32
                                                 
28 For a comprehensive discussion of the circumstances under which provision of budget support seems to be the 
adequate choice of a financial aid instrument see Foster and Leavy (2001). Cordella and Dell’Ariccia (2003) 
present an economic model in which they compare the effectiveness of budget support and project aid based on 
the degree of alignment of the donor’s and recipient’s preferences. 
29 Svensson (2000), for example, addresses the question under which conditions the disbursement of foreign aid 
increases the level of costly reform effort chosen by the aid recipients. As the exertion of some positive level of 
reform effort is assumed to increase the expected welfare of society, Svensson’s definition of reform is closely 
related to the definition used in this paper, namely that of reform being the adoption of a superior policy. The 
model’s basic prediction is that if it is common knowledge that disbursements of foreign aid are partly guided by 
the needs of the poor, without effective conditionality the provision of foreign aid adversely affects the aid 
recipients’ incentives to undertake structural reforms that would reduce poverty. Reform effort with the 
provision of foreign aid is lower than in a situation without foreign aid: if effort is not observable, the level of aid 
provided is a compromise between giving aid to those in most need and providing optimal incentives as there is 
moral hazard in that aid flows according to the need lower the incentive to exert effort ex ante. 
30 The analysis of conditional aid seems to be trivial anyway as the promise of foreign aid conditioned on the 
implementation of policy reform will always raise the incentives to enact a reform and thus, will weakly 
accelerate reform in those models in which the implementation of reform is decided upon by comparing a 
reform’s (expected) benefits and costs. 
 
all. Some of the models explaining non-adoption or delayed adoption of socially beneficial 
reform make use of concepts for which the incorporation of budget support does not seem to 
be meaningful: If it is lack of human capital or private information of politicians on the 
superiority of socially beneficial reform that hinders reform from being implemented, as 
suggested by Williamson (1994a), budget support does not seem to influence the timing of 
reform at all. In Drudi and Prati’s (2000) signaling model of fiscal policy the arrival of budget 
support is counterproductive because it prolongs the time it takes to accumulate a level of debt 
sufficiently high to allow for signaling, but it has no welfare implications as pre-reform 
policies do not induce deadweight losses.31 In Fernandez and Rodrik’s (1991) two period, 
uncertainty about benefits from reform model, unconditional budget support cannot be 
integrated in a sensible way since the decision whether to implement a reform or not does 
only depend on those changes of expected utility that are induced by the reform. 
 
2.1 Acceleration 
In Orphanides’ (1996) multistage model, budget support can affect the decision to start a 
stabilization attempt, its likelihood of success and the possibility of its abandonment. 
Orphanides’ model predicts that unanticipated budget support weakly accelerates 
stabilizations independent of its arrival date: When a stabilization program has already been 
initiated, budget support unambiguously increases the probability of its success since it 
reduces the internal costs of further adjustments potentially necessary in the stop decision 
state. For budget support arriving before it has been decided whether to start a stabilization 
program, two cases have to be considered: If without the arrival of budget support 
postponement of stabilization would have been optimal as the level of initially available 
reserves is below the threshold value, R<R*, budget support may improve conditions 
sufficiently to make starting a stabilization optimal. If the government would have attempted 
a stabilization even in the absence of budget support, budget support can be used to increase 
the stabilization program’s probability of success by choosing a higher level of initial 
adjustment.32  
 
2.2 Delay 
33
                                                 
31 In the context of this paper, it would be interesting to extend Drudi and Prati’s (2000) model to be able to 
analyze the welfare implications of a later date of stabilization. 
32 Alternatively, budget support could be used to reduce the adjustment costs for a given level of success. As 
Orphanides stresses, this option motivates conditionality if the aid-giving organization is primarily concerned 
with the success of a stabilization attempt while the recipient government might have a tendency to reduce the 
costs of the stabilization attempt. 
 
While Orphanides’ model predicts unanticipated foreign aid to accelerate stabilizations, 
results are different for anticipated foreign aid. As the government decides on whether to 
postpone or abandon a stabilization attempt by comparing its present and future costs, 
anticipation in a start decision state that foreign aid will arrive with a positive probability will 
raise the threshold R* at which stabilization is enacted in the absence of aid. Similarly, in a 
stop decision state, the anticipation of foreign aid will raise the probability that the current 
stabilization program is abandoned as the threshold value X* of the stochastic component of 
the demand for reserves, X, will be reduced, thus lowering the probability that the government 
is willing to undertake the adjustment necessary to successfully complete the stabilization 
attempt. 
 
Many models of delayed stabilization presented in chapter two can be interpreted as 
formalizations of the so-called “crisis hypothesis”33 that postulates that a deteriorating 
economic situation accelerates or even induces reform. If a crisis is assumed to be the result of 
a negative shock hitting the economy, while foreign aid can be modeled as a positive shock 
one could loosely conclude that foreign aid, by cushioning the effects of an economic crisis, 
will delay stabilizations. Before analyzing which of the models reviewed so far use this line of 
reasoning to argue that foreign aid delays stabilization, the following gives a brief overview 
on the discussion concerning the crisis hypothesis. 
Focusing primarily on welfare implications of crises, Drazen and Grilli (1993) articulate 
most explicitly what they call the “benefit-of-crisis view”: from a dynamic perspective, crises 
may be welfare-improving as they might enable societies to adopt welfare improving reforms 
that would be impossible to enact in less distortionary circumstances. Parallel to Alesina and 
Drazen’s war-of-attrition model, the key to their benefit-of-crisis view is the assumption that 
in the absence of an agreement of all interest groups, some part of the budget must be 
financed via distortionary means. This results in a trade-off concerning the welfare level of a 
society: while higher distortions obviously lower welfare until an agreement is reached, 
distortions also induce an earlier time of agreement on the use of non-distortionary means of 
financing the government budget by raising the costs of living in an unstabilized economy.  
Although broad support for the benefit-of-crisis hypothesis can be found in the economic 
literature on reform, the hypothesis is not unchallenged: Rodrik sharply criticizes the idea that 
crisis is the instigator of reform by pointing out “that there is a strong element of tautology in 
34
                                                 
33 See Drazen (2000), p.446ff. For example, in Olson (1982) an economic crisis may weaken the power of some 
influential interest groups sufficiently to bring about reform. In Labán and Sturzenegger (1994a) a severe 
deterioration of the status quo can induce acceptance of an uncertain reform outcome. 
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the association of reform with crisis. Reform naturally becomes an issue only when current 
policies are perceived to be not working. A crisis is just an extreme instance of policy failure. 
That policy reform should follow crisis, then, is no more surprising than smoke following 
fire.”TP34 PT Drazen responds that the degree to which this argument is convincing clearly depends 
on the exact role crisis is assigned to in promoting reform and the definition of the term crisis: 
while it might be trivial to claim that reform is more likely to be adopted in bad times, this 
does not correspond to the major point made by Drazen and Grilli, namely that things need to 
get extremely bad (and not just bad) to induce reform.TP35 PT In my opinion, this reply is not 
convincing: though the crisis hypothesis certainly has some intuitive appeal (as well as highly 
controversial implications for policy design), in contrast to Velasco’s common property 
model the war-of-attrition model does not seem to be an adequate formalization of the crisis 
hypothesis since it predicts a stabilization to be enacted after some delay even in the absence 
of any deterioration.TP36 PT As both parties suffer from deterioration proportionally, the degree of 
deterioration does not influence the date of stabilization. As will be shown in chapter four, in 
the context of the war-of-attrition model unconditional foreign aid does not necessarily imply 
a later date of stabilization. 
The effect that a crisis will increase the probability of stabilization as it increases the cost 
of continued delay also exists in Hsieh’s (2000) bargaining extension of the war-of-attrition 
model. Similarly, foreign aid that is used to reduce the costs of stabilization can be shown to 
decrease the probability of an agreement to stabilize. The probability of stabilization in the 
second period increases with the workers offering the capitalists a lower share 2α . This is the 
case if the workers expect the upper bound of the capitalists’ income distribution to be 
smaller. Thus, the effects of foreign aid on the probability of stabilization can be examined by 
studying how foreign aid affects the distribution of stabilization costs, or, more specifically, 
by examining the effect of a lower cost of stabilization on the workers’ equilibrium belief on 
the upper bound of the capitalists’ income distribution. Foreign aid used to reduce the costs of 
stabilizing has three different effects: First and obviously, foreign aid directly reduces the 
burden of adjustment holding the cost of delay and the distribution of stabilization costs 
constant. Second, foreign aid indirectly affects the probability of a settlement by changing the 
share of stabilization costs the capitalists are asked to bear in the first period, 1α . In the 
specific bargaining model of Hsieh the first and the second effect just cancel. Third, a smaller 
budget gap due to foreign aid reduces the amount of distortionary taxation and by this, lowers 
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PT Rodrik (1996), p.26. 
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PT Cf. Drazen (2000), p. 444ff. 
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36
PT Compare the argument laid down in section 2.4.3, p.21. 
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the welfare loss from continued delay. A smaller welfare loss in the absence of a stabilization 
agreement induces the workers to make the capitalists a less favorable offer. In sum, the last 
and net effect of foreign aid decreases the probability of an agreement to stabilize. 
A model that provides a convincing formalization of the crisis hypothesis is Velasco’s 
(1998) common property model: While Velasco does not make any statement on what the 
provision of unconditional foreign aid would imply for the date of stabilization, he briefly 
summarizes the effects of an economic crisis modeled as an exogenous shock that decreases 
non-tax government revenues y permanently. Similarly, modeling foreign aid (that starts at 
time zero and lasts at least until the date of stabilization) as an exogenous increase of y allows 
examining the effects of foreign aid. Comparative statics with respect to y using the two 
conditions that define the date of stabilization, T, and the level of government wealth, b, that 
induces a switch from appropriative to cooperative behavior yield the following results: First, 
an exogenous rise of y implies that a higher level of government debt is needed to induce 
cooperative behavior. The condition that utility from stabilizing just equals utility that can be 
obtained by defecting, )()( t
d
t
s bUbU = , that defines the level of b at which a switch from 
appropriative to cooperative behavior takes place requires a lower value of b, *** bb < , to be 
met. Second, as the date of stabilization is defined by the smallest T for which Tb <
**b  and 
government wealth is decreasing over time, provision of foreign aid implies a higher value of 
T, that is a later date of stabilization.TP37 PT 
 
2.3 No effect 
In Labán and Sturzenegger (1994a) unconditional foreign aid arriving in the first or the 
second period implies the same extent of rise in utility on both sides of equations (14) and 
(15) if it is assumed that unconditional budget support implies additional consumption at the 
individual level. Consequently, unconditional budget support does not affect the agreement 
areas described by conditions (16) and (17) that exclusively consider benefits and costs 
induced by stabilization. Thus, Labán and Sturzenegger’s model predicts budget support not 
to influence the date of stabilization.TP38 PT 
As will be shown in chapter IV, for the specific functional assumptions made Alesina and 
Drazen’s (1991) war-of-attrition model also predicts that unanticipated foreign aid used to 
                                                 
TP
37
PT Taking these two effects together budget support would c.p. lower welfare as the deadweight loss is incurred 
for a higher number of periods. Budget support’s overall effect on welfare is nevertheless ambiguous as higher 
government resources y also imply that there are more resources available for making net transfers. 
TP
38
PT Due to the model’s infinite horizon, the implications of unconditional budget support are less clear in Labán 
and Sturzenegger (1994b). 
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finance government expenditures g does not affect the timing of stabilization as the optimal 
time of concession does not depend on the size of the government budget. 
 
2.4 Selectivity as a means to induce acceleration 
Building on Boone (1996) who stresses the importance of the (exogenous) type of 
political regime for the effectiveness of aid programsTP39 PT, Drazen (1999) makes use of 
Velasco’s (1998) common property approach to endogenize the type of regime that is 
characterized by the degree of appropriative behavior. As in Velasco (1998), interest groups 
find appropriative behavior optimal only if there are many resources to be appropriated. A 
further mutuality is the crucial role for economic deterioration and crisis: appropriation leads 
to a deterioration in the economy, a decrease in government wealth. While a crisis reflecting 
an extremely low level of government wealth may induce a switch to cooperative behavior 
(that corresponds to the adoption of a superior policy), unconditional foreign aid may delay 
such a switch in behavior by cushioning the effects of deterioration.  
Drazen’s additional point is that providing aid selectivelyTP40 PT, that is based on the perception 
of the nature of the political regime, can hasten stabilization since the selective provision of 
foreign aid can induce a switch away from appropriative behavior when economic 
deterioration is far less extreme than in a crisis. This result is established by investigating 
trigger strategy equilibria in which cooperation can only be sustained if utility from 
cooperation exceeds utility from defecting from cooperation:  
(27) 0),(),( >− ZWUZWU tdefectiontncooperatio , 
where utility can be written as an explicit function of current wealth tW  and current aid 
inflows Z. To model selectivity it is assumed that countries in which appropriation takes place 
in period t get no aid in t+1. Thus, another interpretation of Z adopted in the following is that 
it equals the amount of aid that is (potentially) cut off. Equation (27) can be shown to be 
negative for W>W*(Z) and positive for W<W*(Z), where the critical value W*(Z) is 
increasing in Z. It follows that the larger is the aid cut-off induced by appropriative behavior 
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PT Boone (1996) characterizes regimes by whose citizens’ utility they maximize, e.g. both elitist and egalitarian 
governments appropriate aid, but while the former transfer it to a high-income political elite, beneficiaries under 
the egalitarian regime are households with low initial income. In Boone’s model, aid is only effective in non-
appropriative Laissez-Faire regimes that use aid to lower distortionary taxes, which leads to higher investment 
and growth. 
TP
40
PT Drazen (1999a) tries to draw a distinction between conditionality and selectivity. In Drazen’s terminology, 
conditionality means withdrawing aid in response to the failure to pursue a specific set of economic policies 
previously agreed upon, while he defines selectivity as not giving aid based on the donor’s perception of the 
nature of regime in the recipient country. Criticism of this model could refer to the fact that, in a context in 
which a political regime is defined by the policies it pursues, the distinction between selectivity and 
conditionality seems to be an artificial one. 
(that is the larger is Z), the less an economy must deteriorate for cooperative behavior to 
become optimal. What Drazen adds to the result of Velasco’s common property model that 
unconditional foreign aid delays stabilization is that providing and cutting-off foreign aid 
selectively based on the perception of the political regime is a means to accelerate 
stabilization. Obviously, the use of selectivity requires the appropriative nature of the regime 
to be known and, even if this prerequisite is met, is extremely controversial as it can be 
considered as a donor’s indirect attempt to intervene in a country’s domestic politics. From a 
theoretical perspective, modeling selectivity is one possible step towards investigating the 
conditions under which foreign aid is granted more carefully beyond the distinction of 
conditional and unconditional foreign aid.  
 
3. Empirical evidence 
 
3.1 Case studies 
Discussing both the politics and the economics of achieving stabilization, Williamson 
(1994a) encompasses a comprehensive summary of papers, many of those analyzing the role 
of foreign aid on the date of macroeconomic stabilizations in a large variety of countries. In 
sum, they present very ambiguous historical evidence about whether foreign aid delays or 
accelerates the implementation of policy reform. 
One of the most ardent proponents of the hypothesis that foreign aid is a crucial 
component of successful reform is Jeffrey Sachs: Sachs (1994) claims that successful reform 
requires both a government that is committed to reform and, equally important, foreign aid. 
He considers international help to be absolutely critical to allow reform-friendly governments 
to survive long enough to implement reforms that he considers to be inherently fragile at the 
outset. To support his view Sachs provides a great variety of examples including the 
transformation of Poland and Russia, the role of the Marshall Plan in post-war Germany, US 
assistance to post-war Japan, Bolivia’s successful stabilization after hyperinflation in 1987, 
Chile’s successful economic reforms in 1980s and the role of US foreign aid for Israel’s 
successful stabilization in 1985. 
Haggard (1994) challenges Sachs’ hypothesis that the provision of external aid is crucial 
to support reformers by arguing that politicians have reduced incentives to undertake 
politically costly reforms when they know that the problems addressed by reform can be 
cushioned at lower costs by the use of foreign aid. He gives the examples of the Philippines at 
the end of the Marcos era and the current situation of aid-dependent African countries to 
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underscore his point of view. 
Referring to Sachs’ idea that aid can help “good governments to survive long enough to 
solve problems”41, Rodrik (1996) claims that aid can also help bad governments to survive 
and cites the example of Korean and Taiwanese reforms in the 1960s that, in his opinion, only 
took place because plentiful US aid that had been provided during the 1950s was coming to 
an end. 
Rodrik (1994) uses episodes of Turkish history to make the point that foreign aid can 
delay the implementation of policy reform: being hit severely by the first oil shock in 1974, 
Rodrik claims that it were only generous capital inflows from abroad (in form of external 
borrowing) that allowed Turkey to avoid necessary adjustments and to sustain its otherwise 
unsustainable expansionary fiscal policies culminating in a debt crisis. In 1980-81, generous 
foreign aid eroded the political perception under the new government that it was necessary to 
undertake painful economic measures to reduce the budget deficit. 
 
3.2 Econometric cross-country analysis 
Due to the problem of finding implementable measures of crisis and reform, econometric 
studies on the crisis hypothesis and the implications of the provision of foreign aid on the date 
of stabilization are rare and present mixed evidence. Bruno and Easterly (1996) define a crisis 
as extremely low macroeconomic performance. Their basic idea for testing the crisis 
hypothesis is to look at an indicator of macroeconomic performance at date t and at 
subsequent dates t+s, s>0. As policy indicators are persistent over time, one would expect 
indicators to be positively correlated across periods. In contrast to that, the crisis hypothesis 
predicts that extremely poor performance at t implies not simply good performance at t+s, but 
even better performance at t+s than if performance at t was just moderately bad.42 Defining 
high inflation as inflation over 40% annually for two or more years, Bruno and Easterly’s 
starting point is their finding that in countries with high-inflation crisis growth falls sharply 
during inflation crises, but growth after crises rises above the pre-crisis level although 
inflation is at about the pre-crisis level or even slightly higher. This finding can be considered 
to provide evidence for Drazen and Grilli’s crisis hypothesis if it can be shown that only 
countries in a severe crisis reformed while those with moderate crisis did not reform. In fact, 
using pooled cross-country data for 1960-1994, Bruno and Easterly show that the relationship 
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41 Sachs (1994), p.512 
42 This approach can be criticized for not measuring reform directly but taking it to be represented by a change in 
macroeconomic outcome, more precisely by a situation in which poor macroeconomic performance at date t is 
followed by significant improvement. 
 
between inflation lagged five years and current inflation normally thought to be 
monotonically positive becomes downward sloping at sufficiently high inflation levels, that is 
at 150 to 200% per year.  
Drazen and Easterly (1999) extend Bruno and Easterly’s work in various ways: first, they 
consider alternative ways of how to define a reference level relative to which crisis is 
measured and show that results are robust to different ways of measurement. Second, they use 
a wider set of policy indicators and establish the result that only inflation and black market 
premium behave as predicted by the crisis hypothesis while growth rates of GDP per capita, 
current account deficit and public sector deficit do not. Trying to explain this finding they 
examine the relationship between each of these indicators and foreign aid (measured as 
Overseas Development Finance (ODF) in percentage of GDP) and find some evidence for the 
hypothesis that the provision of foreign aid delays reform. There is a high positive correlation 
between fiscal and current account deficits and foreign aid received – a result that Drazen and 
Easterly use to explain the failure of extreme levels of deficits to induce reform by suggesting 
that foreign aid cushions the perception of a crisis in case of huge deficits. In contrast to that, 
they show that there are negative correlations between received aid and very large levels of 
inflation or extremely high black market premium. The absence of large amounts of aid may 
explain why extremely high levels of inflation or black market premium were found to act as 
reform-inducing crises. In sum, these results can be interpreted to indicate that foreign aid 
delays macroeconomic reforms. 
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To further investigate the role of foreign aid, Bruno and Easterly (1996) compare two 
categories of developing countries with debt crises that lead to rescheduling of debt, namely 
debtors with inflation crisis (with inflation exceeding 40%) and inflation stabilization to those 
that had persistent low inflation (inflation of less than 20%).43 Both groups started in 1980 
with about the same amount of ODF, but while until 1993 ODF increased in the low-inflation 
group it decreased sharply in the high inflation group as the provision of aid seems to be 
conditioned upon the absence of very high inflation: explaining median ODF/GDP as a 
function of one year lagged inflation based on pooled cross-country data for 1960-1994, ODF 
turns down at about 150-200 percent inflation. Bruno and Easterly conclude that the cut-off of 
aid for high inflation might provide an extra-incentive to stabilize. Interestingly, their results 
contradict the prediction of Casella and Eichengreen’s model (see chapter IV, section 2) as aid 
disbursed early, that is at low levels of inflation, does not seem to hasten stabilization, but to 
hinder it.  
 
43 Bruno and Easterly’s results should be treated very carefully as they may be partially driven by the fact that 
they exclude countries with moderate or high inflation and no stabilization from their analysis. 
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IV. Inclusion of foreign aid in the war-of-attrition model 
 
1. Unanticipated foreign aid  
As Casella and Eichengreen (1996) point out, in Alesina and Drazen’s war-of-attrition 
model, unanticipated foreign aid used to reduce present discounted government spending by a 
share (1-β), with 10 << β , does not affect the timing of stabilization, as the date of 
stabilization does not depend on the size of the government budget g. This can be seen by 
examining the expression for T`(θ): 
(28) 
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As both the gain if the other player concedes first, rg /)12( −α , and the cost of waiting 
another instant to concede, gg αθ −+ )2/1( , are proportional to the size of the government 
budget g, g cancels in equation (28). The result that the optimal time of concession does not 
depend on the size of the budget is due to the assumptions made, namely (i) that the utility 
loss of distortionary taxation is linear in the level of pre-stabilization taxes and (ii) that 
without an agreement to stabilize, a fixed fraction of the government budget is financed by 
distortionary taxes.TP44 PT If these assumptions were removed, the size of the budget, and thus the 
provision of foreign aid used to reduce the internally financed amount of government 
spending would affect the timing of stabilizations. 
Assume for example that pre-stabilization distortions rise more than proportional in the 
level of government spending g, as e.g. in ggu )2/1( +−= θ , while lifetime utilities after 
stabilization remain unchanged. This yields  
(29) 
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which, as )`(θT  is negative, is increasing in g, 0/)`( >∂∂ gT θ . As the provision of 
unanticipated foreign aid reduces internally financed government spending g, the slope of the 
optimal time of concession function after the provision of foreign aid will be steeper than 
before for every value of θ. Furthermore, the boundary condition that an agent with the 
                                                 
TP
44
PT In the version of the model presented here, the fraction of government expenditures financed by taxes, γ, is set 
equal to one, which is the reason why γ does not show up in equation (28). 
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highest possible cost parameter, θ , will give up immediately, 0)( =θT , is valid both with and 
without unanticipated foreign aid. This implies that unanticipated foreign aid will delay 
stabilization for the specific assumptions made. Intuitively, this result stems from the fact that 
the dominant effect of the provision of foreign aid is to reduce the utility loss due to 
distortions more than proportionally and thus, to weaken incentives to stabilize. 
Similarly, if the utility loss from distortions is assumed to be concave in the level of 
government spending, e.g. ggu )2/1/( +−= θ , which implies 
(30) 
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so that 0/)`( <∂∂ gT θ , the war-of-attrition model predicts that foreign aid will accelerate 
stabilization. 
 
2. Casella and Eichengreen’s model of anticipated foreign aid 
Casella and Eichengreen’s (1996) approach to incorporating foreign aid in the war-of-
attrition model is motivated by the observation that the disbursal of foreign aid is rarely 
unexpected. Assuming that foreign aid is announced at date s to arrive at date v, Casella and 
Eichengreen obtain the result that whether the provision of anticipated foreign aid accelerates 
or delays stabilization is a matter of timing: stabilization is accelerated only by anticipated 
foreign aid that is announced and disbursed early in the game, while it is delayed otherwise. 
For the same reason why unanticipated foreign aid does not influence the date of 
stabilization for the functional assumptions made, it is true that if stabilization has not yet 
taken place by the date foreign aid is disbursed, formally T≥v, the fact that foreign aid has 
arrived and government spending is reduced will not influence the path of the game after date 
v. Thus, the path of the game after date v is described by equation (28). The announcement of 
foreign aid at date s to arrive at date v will only change the game’s incentives in the interval 
between s and v. For T [,[ vs∈ , flow utilities before and after stabilization, 
gtu ii )2/1()( θ+−=  and gU L α−=  for the loser and gU W )1( α−−=  for the winner 
respectively, remain unchanged, but flow utilities after the disbursal of foreign aid, t≥v, are 
gU L αβ−= and gU W βα )1( −−= . Consequently, lifetime utilities after stabilization are 
modified if it is common knowledge that government spending will be reduced from v 
onward. It is only for those periods after stabilization in which aid has not yet been disbursed 
that government spending equals g while it is reduced to level βg afterwards: 
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(31) ∫ ∫− ∞− −− −+−= Tv Tv rtrtLT dtgedtgeV 0 αβα  
or, after evaluating the integrals 
(32) regV TvrLT /])1(1[
)( −−−−−= βα  and similarly, regV TvrWT /])1(1[)1( )( −−−−−−= βα . 
Casella and Eichengreen derive the slope of the optimal time of concession between s and 
v, )`(~ θT , by plugging functional forms into the equilibrium condition of Alesina and 
Drazen’s war-of-attrition model, equation (A3) in appendix A, except for one modification: 
they modify equation (A3) by substituting LrV by LU  based on the insight that in the original 
model without foreign aid LL UgrgrrV =−=−= αα / , which yields: 
(A3’) 
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Substituting functional assumptions specified above, they get 
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where )()1(1)( tvret −−−−≡ βσ  with 1)(0 << tσ  ],[ vst ∈∀ . Comparing )`(θT  in equation 
(A4) and )`(~ θT , the anticipation of foreign aid can be shown to have two effects: First, 
anticipated foreign aid provides an incentive for stabilizing earlier. As foreign aid reduces the 
future fiscal burden it decreases the marginal cost of conceding. Formally, the difference in 
lifetime utilities after stabilization, LW VV − , decreases from level rg /)12( −α without foreign 
aid being anticipated to rgT /)~()12( σα − after the arrival of foreign aid has been announced. 
Second, there is an incentive to postpone conceding closer to the date at which the reduction 
of the fiscal burden materializes, that is to the moment when foreign aid is actually disbursed. 
A later date of concession implies that both loser and winner have to bear the full fiscal 
burden after stabilization, gα  and g)1( α−  respectively, instead of the reduced one after the 
arrival of foreign aid, gαβ  and gβα )1( − , for a smaller number of periods. This is the reason 
why the lifetime utility of the loser after stabilization is increasing in T when foreign aid is 
anticipated, dTdV L / >0 in equation (A3’), while it does not change over time in the basic 
war-of-attrition model, dTdV L / =0 in equation (28). 
While these two contradicting effects provide a first intuition of why anticipated foreign 
aid may either result in delayed or accelerated stabilization, Casella and Eichengreen also 
offer a line of reasoning based on the slope of the optimal time of concession function. The 
basic idea of Casella and Eichengreen’s proof is that, in expectation, stabilization will take 
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place earlier if, for any type conceding in the interval between s and v, the optimal time of 
concession is smaller with than it would have been without foreign aid. Thus, a necessary 
condition for stabilization to be accelerated is that the slope of the function )(~ θT  at the time 
of the announcement must be flatter than the slope of the original function.TP45 PT As slopes are 
negative (except for a negative denominator of )(~ θT , a scenario that will be discussed 
below), this condition corresponds to )`()`(~ ss TT θθ > . sθ  characterizes the player who is just 
indifferent between conceding and waiting at time s and is defined by sT s =)(θ . Simplifying 
and making use of the fact that 1)(0 << tσ , the necessary condition for an earlier stabilization 
reduces to 
(34) αθ 22/1 >+s . 
For an earlier expected date of stabilization to be realized with probability one, (i) the slope of 
T~ needs to be flatter than the slope of T over the entire interval [s,v] and (ii) the expectation 
of foreign aid may not bring about any discontinuities in the optimal concession behavior. The 
latter is true if the marginal benefit of conceding depicted by the second part of the 
denominator of equation (33) is positive so that players can never gain from delay: 
(35) )]~(2[2/1 Tσαθ −>+  ],[ sv θθθ ∈∀ .TP46 PT 
In the absence of any discontinuities, the optimal time of concession function with anticipated 
foreign aid is given by 
  T(θ) defined by equation (A4) and the boundary condition 0)( =θT  for 0 <≤ T s 
(36) )(~ θT  defined by equation (33) and the boundary condition sT s =)(~ θ  for vTs <≤  
   T(θ) defined by equation (A4) and the boundary condition vT v =)(θ  for vT ≥ . 
Equation (36) underlines that, as stressed in section 1, it is the anticipation of foreign aid that 
modifies equilibrium concession behavior. Consequently, it is only in the interval between 
announcement and disbursal of foreign aid, vTs <≤ , that )(~ θT describes the optimal 
concession behavior, while it is given by T(θ) and the respective boundary conditions 
otherwise. 
                                                 
TP
45
PT Casella and Eichengreen miss to point out that this is only a necessary requirement for stabilization to be 
hastened if )(~ θT  is a strictly convex function – which it is given the specific assumptions made, but not 
necessarily for a broader set of functional assumptions. Otherwise one could think of a function )(~ θT that is 
steeper than T(θ) in s, but crosses T(θ) at some vθθ < . 
TP
46
PT In the basic war-of-attrition model, Alesina and Drazen simply assume 2/1−> αθ  to avoid a situation with 
a negative marginal benefit from conceding. 
 
45
The slope of T~ is flatter than the slope of the original function at the date at which foreign 
aid is disbursed if )`()`(~ vv TT θθ ≥ , where vθ  is defined by vT v =)(~ θ . The condition 
)`()`(~ vv TT θθ ≥  can be shown to be equivalent to 
(37) αθ 22/1 ≥+v . 
From s<v it follows that vs θθ >  which has two important implications: first, as the condition 
αθ 22/1 >+  is met for all θ larger or equal to vθ  and as 1)(0 << tσ , the necessary condition 
and the condition for no discontinuities will always be met if equation (37) is true. Second, as 
T is monotonic in θ, it implies that equation (37) is a sufficient condition for stabilization to 
be hastened as it guarantees that )(~ θT is flatter than T(θ) on the whole interval [s,v]. As there 
are no a priori restrictions on parameters that justify to assume that equation (37) is always 
met, these considerations make Casella and Eichengreen claim that it is the timing of foreign 
aid that is decisive for whether foreign aid delays or accelerates stabilization as they 
summarize in their main proposition:  
“If there is delay between the time foreign aid is announced and the time it is 
disbursed, then there exist two dates s* and v* (s*<v*) such that foreign aid 
announced after s* will delay stabilization, while aid disbursed before v* will hasten  
it. s* is the solution to: T(θ*)=s*, and v* to: T~ (θ*)=v, where θ*+1/2=2α.”TP47 PT 
 
3. Modified version of Casella and Eichengreen’s model 
Deriving the slope of the optimal time of concession between s and v, )`(~ θT , by plugging 
functional forms into the equilibrium condition of Alesina and Drazen’s war-of-attrition 
model as Casella and Eichengreen do, is, in general, correct as the maximization problem 
stated in terms of non-specified functional forms as in equation (A1) in appendix A stays the 
same for the addition of foreign aid. But, as has been pointed out above, Casella and 
Eichengreen use a slightly changed equilibrium condition of the basic war-of-attrition model 
in which LrV , the fraction of the loser’s lifetime utility after stabilization that is associated 
with one out of an infinite number of periods after stabilization, has been substituted by the 
loser’s flow utility after stabilization, LU . While this is a valid modification in the original 
war-of-attrition model in which gU L α−= and rgV L /α−= , it is not a correct modification 
in the model that has been extended to include the effects of anticipated foreign aid: Adding 
                                                 
TP
47
PT Casella and Eichengreen (1996), p.613. 
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anticipated foreign aid, gU L α−=  remains unchanged for T [,[ vs∈ , but LV  now corresponds 
to ])1(1[/ )( TvrL ergV −−−−−= βα . The new expression for LV  reflects the fact that with 
anticipated foreign aid flow utility after stabilization differs across periods: for the loser, it 
corresponds to gα  in the periods before foreign aid has been disbursed and to gαβ  
afterwards. Consequently, the relation LrV = LU  that Casella and Eichengreen make use of to 
derive their results is no more trueTP48 PT and the correct slope of the equilibrium concession 
function is given by 
(A3) 
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instead of (A3’). For the functional assumptions made, equation (A3) yields 
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The most striking feature of the slope of the correct equilibrium concession function is that, 
while the numerator corresponds to the one derived by Casella and Eichengreen, the 
denominator equals the one in absence of anticipated foreign aid. The second part of the 
denominator of equation (A3), dTdVrVu LL /−+− , can be interpreted to represent the 
marginal “net” benefit from conceding: in case of concession, a player’s next period payoff is 
LrV , the fraction of the loser’s lifetime utility after stabilization that is associated with one 
out of an infinite number of periods after stabilization. When a player decides to wait his 
marginal utility corresponds to u, the player’s flow utility before stabilization, plus dTdV L / , 
the increase in the loser’s lifetime utility after stabilization induced by postponing 
stabilization one more period. The reason why the denominator remains unchanged after 
adding anticipated foreign aid is that the inclusion of foreign aid modifies LrV  and dTdV L /  
in exactly the same way: without foreign aid grgrrV L αα −=−= /  and dTdV L / =0, while 
when foreign aid is anticipated )()( )1(])1(1[ TvrTvrL eggegrV −−−− −+−=−−−= βααβα  and 
)()1(/ TvrL egdTdV −−−= βα . Obviously, gdTdVrV LL α−=− /  both with and without the 
anticipation of foreign aid. 
                                                 
TP
48
PT An exception is the specific case in which the date of stabilization and the arrival date of foreign aid coincide, 
v=T, so that gU L αβ−=  is equivalent to gegegrV TvrL αββαβα −=−−−=−−−= −− ])1(1[])1(1[ 0)( . 
TP
49
PT Unfortunately, I could not find a closed form solution )(~ θT  to the differential equation given by equation (38) 
without assigning specific values to the parameters. 
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Casella and Eichengreen correctly stress that the fact that dTdV L / >0 provides an 
incentive to delay stabilization. A point that their model misses because they specify )`(~ θT  as 
depicted in equation (A3’) instead of (A3) is that, besides the decrease in LW VV − , there 
exists a further incentive to hasten stabilization, namely the rise in LrV  induced by the 
anticipation of foreign aid. Since, as shown above, the changes in LrV  and dTdV L /  are the 
same in absolute level, but have different signs, the two effects just cancel. The only 
remaining net effect of anticipated foreign aid on equilibrium behavior is that foreign aid 
reduces the future fiscal burden and thus, diminishes the marginal cost of conceding. This 
provides a first intuition of why the corrected solution of Casella and Eichengreen’s model 
yields the result that anticipated foreign aid unambiguously accelerates stabilization. 
Obviously, this result sharply contrasts Casella and Eichengreen’s claim that foreign aid 
announced and delivered after critical dates for announcement, s*, and disbursement, v*, will 
delay stabilization. 
To manifest the result that anticipated foreign aid will always accelerate stabilization, two 
additional lines of reasoning will be offered in the following. The first is simply based on a 
comparison of the slopes of the functions describing optimal concession behavior with and 
without foreign aid, 
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keeping equation (36) in mind. If stabilization has not yet taken place at the date at which 
foreign aid is announced, it is straightforward to show that the graph of )(~ θT  is always below 
that of T(θ) for t>s, which implies a strictly earlier date of stabilization: from 0< )(tσ <1 t∀  
and 2/1−> αθ  it follows )`()`(~ θθ TT >  θ∀ . Thus, anticipated foreign aid implies an 
earlier optimal date of concession for all combinations of s and v and all realizations of 
sθθ < . 
Another approach is to follow Casella and Eichengreen’s proof that is based on 
establishing a necessary and a sufficient condition for stabilization to be hastened: The 
necessary condition states that at date s, at which foreign aid is announced, the slope of the 
optimal time of concession function with foreign aid being announced has to be smaller in 
absolute value than the slope of the original function:  
)`()`(~ ss TT θθ >  
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which, as 0< )(tσ <1, will be true if  
(39) 2/1−> αθ s . 
To be able to rule out any discontinuities in the optimal concession behavior the marginal 
benefit from conceding, that is the denominator of )`(~ θT , needs to be positive for all θ which 
requires 
(40) 2/1−>αθ  θ∀ . 
If the optimal time of concession can be described by a continuous function, a sufficient 
condition for stabilization to be hastened is given by )`()`(~ vv TT θθ ≥ which reduces to 
(41) 2/1−≥ αθ v . 
To be able to abstract from a situation in which there are incentives to never give up so that 
T(θ) would go towards infinity, the lower bound of θ has been restricted to exceed α-1/2, 
2/1−>αθ , in the basic war-of-attrition model. Since the announcement date of foreign aid s 
is defined by sT s =)(θ , the arrival date v by vT v =)(~ θ  with 0≤ s<v and we know from 
equation (36) that sT s =)(~ θ  and, furthermore, )(~ θT  is monotonically decreasing in θ for 
2/1−>αθ  it follows that θθθθ ≤<≤ sv . Consequently, equations (39), (40) and (41) will 
be met for all possible realizations of s and v as well as for all θ.  
 
Proposition 1: 
As 2/1−≥ αθ  for all ],[ θθθ ∈  and θθθθ ≤<≤ sv , the announcement at any time 0≥s  of 
a foreign transfer that will arrive at time v with s<v unambiguously accelerates stabilization if 
it has not yet been enacted at date s. 
 
From equation (36), we know that the optimal concession behavior is described by )`(~ θT  
instead of T`(θ) for sT ≥  only. Intuitively, forthcoming foreign aid has to be announced to 
have any effect (that, by proposition 1, is known to accelerate stabilization). Thus, for any 
given date v, the earlier aid is announced, that is the earlier )`(~ θT  instead of T`(θ) describes 
the optimal concession behavior, the earlier the expected date of stabilization. 
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Proposition 2: 
For any given date v, the earlier aid is announced (the smaller s) the earlier is the expected 
date of stabilization. 
 
Without a general closed form solution for )(~ θT  comparative statics concerning changes 
in v or β cannot be based on determining the signs of vT ∂∂ ~  and β∂∂T~ . 
A smaller value of v has two implications: first, as )(~ θT  is decreasing in θ a smaller value 
of v induces an increase of vθ  that is defined by vT v =)(~ θ . Consider an increase of vθ  from 
level 1vθ  to 2vθ  induced by an earlier arrival date of foreign aid, 21 vv > . An increase of vθ  
reduces the range of θ for which stabilization is accelerated: from date v on or, in terms of θ, 
for vθθ < , the optimal concession behavior is defined by T(θ) and the boundary condition 
vT v =)(θ  and converges to the original optimal time of concession function described by 
T(θ) and T(θ )=0. As this convergence sets in earlier for an earlier disbursement of foreign 
aid, a first effect of a smaller v is to delay stabilization for those cost parameters 1vθθ < . 
Second, the effect of an earlier disbursal of foreign aid for those θ∈  ],[ 2 sv θθ , that is the effect 
on )(~ θT , has to be taken into account. Intuition suggests vT ∂∂ ~  being positive as the 
numerical example provided in the next section underlines: a later disbursal of foreign aid will 
increase the difference in the winner’s and the loser’s lifetime utility after stabilization which 
provides an incentive to delay stabilization. If vT ∂∂ ~ >0, a smaller value of v will imply an 
earlier optimal date of concession for those θ ∈  ],[ 2 sv θθ . In sum, given that vT ∂∂ ~ >0, the net 
effect of a smaller v on the expected time of concession would be ambiguous since, for any 
given date s, a smaller v induces a rise of vθ , but accelerates stabilization with probability one 
only if maxθ ∈  ],[ sv θθ . maxθ  is defined as the maximum cost parameter θ of those cost 
parameters characterizing the two competing interest groups, that is the θ that decides on the 
date of stabilization, T. Another approach to investigating the second effect could be based on 
examining the implications of a smaller v on the difference in the slopes given by )`(~ θT  and 
T`(θ). Since v enters )`(~ θT  via )~(Tσ  only and a smaller value of )~(Tσ  accentuates the 
difference in the slopes, the sign of  
(42) )~1()1( )
~( vTrev Tvr ∂∂−−=∂∂ −−βσ  
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determines whether a smaller v induces an earlier or later expected date of stabilization. 
Unfortunately, the sign of v∂∂σ  cannot be determined without the knowledge of the sign of 
vT ∂∂ ~ . 
The effect of a larger transfer (a smaller β) on the expected date of stabilization can 
neither be calculated directly by evaluating the sign of the derivative β∂∂T~  nor by analyzing 
the implications of the sign of 
(43) )~)1(1()
~( βββσ ∂∂−−=∂∂ −− Tre Tvr  
for the difference in the slopes given by )`(~ θT  and T`(θ) as this would also require the sign of 
β∂∂T~  to be known. Nevertheless it seems to be reasonable to expect a larger transfer to 
reinforce the transfer’s effect and to further accelerate stabilization since a larger transfer 
reduces the marginal benefit of waiting that corresponds to the difference in the winner’s and 
the loser’s lifetime utilities after stabilization. 
 
4. Numerical example 
To illustrate the results laid down in the propositions of section 3 and to elaborate the 
consequences of changes in v or β, consider the following example: Let α=0.75, β=0.5, g=50, 
r=0.05 and assume θ to be uniformly distributed on [0.5, 1.5] so that the density function 
corresponds to f(θ)=1, and the distribution function is F(θ)=θ-0.5. Thus,  
50)2/1( ⋅+−= θu , 
]5.01[75005.0/])5.01(1[5075.0 )(05.0)(05.0 TvTvLfa eeV
−−−− −−=−−⋅−=  and 
]5.01[25005.0/])5.01(1[50)75.01( )(05.0)(05.0 TvTvWfa eeV
−−−− −−=−−⋅−−= , 
where the subscript fa stands for foreign aid. For foreign aid announced to arrive at date v, we 
know from equation (A1) in appendix A that the following maximization problem has to be 
solved to determine the equilibrium function describing the optimal concession behavior, 
)(~ θT : 
(44) )ˆ(),ˆ(max
ˆ
θθθ
θ
FEU = ∫ −− +−θθ θ θˆ )ˆ()( ))](()`()([ TVedxxTexu LrTxrT  
∫∫ −−== +−+ θθθ x wxrTzrTxx dxxfxTVedzzTezu )())](()`()([ )()(ˆ  
= )5.0ˆ( −θ ]]5.01[750)`(50)2/1([ 5.1ˆ ))ˆ((05.0)ˆ(05.0)(05.0∫ −−−− −−⋅⋅+θ θθ TvTxT eedxxTex
 ∫∫ ⋅−−⋅++ −−−−== 5.1 ))((05.0)(05.0)(05.05.1ˆ 1]]5.01[250)`(50)2/1([ x xTvxTzTxx dxeedzzTezθ . 
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Taking the first derivative with respect to θˆ  yields: 
(45) =θˆddEU ]]5.01[750)`(50)2/1([ 5.1ˆ ))ˆ((05.0)ˆ(05.0)(05.0∫ −−−− −−⋅⋅+θ θθ TvTxT eedxxTex  
+ )5.0ˆ( −θ ]5.01[750)ˆ`(05.0)ˆ`(50)ˆ2/1([ ))ˆ((05.0)ˆ(05.0)ˆ(05.0 θθθ θθθ TvTT eTeTe −−−− −⋅+⋅⋅+−
      )]]ˆ`(05.05.0[750 ))ˆ((05.0)ˆ(05.0 θθθ Tee TvT −−− ⋅−⋅−  
∫ −−−− −+⋅+−+ 5.1ˆ ))ˆ((05.0)ˆ(05.0)(05.0 ]]5.01[250)`(50)2/1(θ θθ dxeedzzTez TvTzT . 
The two remaining integrals just cancel. Setting the first derivative equal to zero, dividing by 
)ˆ(05.0 θTe−  and combining terms we get the following expression after solving for )`(~ θT : 
(46) )`(~ θT =
5.1250
]5.01[500
5.0
1 ))ˆ((05.0
−
−
−−
−−
θθ
θTve . 
To be able to analyze the effects of anticipated foreign aid, a comparison of equilibrium 
behavior with and the one without foreign aid might be useful. This requires the calculation of 
the equilibrium concession behavior in the basic war-of-attrition model. For the given 
parameters, utility functions in the basic model correspond to 50)2/1( ⋅+−= θu , 
750/ −=−= rgV L α  and 250/)1( −=−−= rgV W α . Solving the general maximization 
problem stated in equation (A1) of appendix A yields 
(47) 
)5.1250(
500
)5.0(
1)`( −−−= θθθT . 
The function describing the optimal concession behavior in the basic war-of-attrition model, 
that is in the absence of foreign aid, can be obtained by integration using the method of partial 
fractions and the boundary condition T(θ )=0. For unspecified parameters, this yields equation 
(A8) in appendix B. Substituting the parametric choices made in equation (A8), one obtains 
(48) T(θ)=-40[ln(θ-0.5)-ln(0.8θ-0.2)]. 
According to equation (36), the optimal concession behavior with anticipated foreign aid 
as a function of the individual-specific cost parameter θ is described by the following 
piecewise function: 
    T(θ)  defined by equation (47) and the boundary condition 0)5.1( =T  for 0 <≤ T s 
(36’) )(~ θT  defined by equation (46) and the boundary condition sT s =)(~ θ  for vTs <≤  
    T(θ)  defined by equation (47) and the boundary condition vT v =)(θ  for vT ≥ . 
Specifying the date at which foreign aid will be announced, s, and the one at which it will be 
disbursed, v, allows deriving sθ  and vθ  that are defined by sT s =)(θ  and vT v =)(~ θ  and 
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consequently, offers all information necessary to evaluate the boundary conditions. The first 
line of equation (36’) corresponds to equation (48). The solution to the second line is obtained 
by solving the ordinary differential equation specified in equation (46) for the general 
boundary condition sT s =)(~ θ , which yields: 
2222222)(05.02 3264816144/{)12()14(ln[20)(~ sssss
vsevT θθθθθθθθθθθ +−+−−+−−−−+= −  
]}]26161626[3264 2222)(05.02 ssss
vs
ss e θθθθθθθθθθθθ −+−++−+−+ − . 
Integrating the expression in equation (47) by partial fractions where the constant of 
integration is defined by the general boundary condition vT v =)(θ  yields the explicit solution 
to line three of equation (36’): 
vT
vv
+−
−−−
−−= )]
25.0
25.0ln()
5.0
5.0[ln(40)( θ
θ
θ
θθ . 
Figure IV.1 visualizes proposition 2: for any given date v, the earlier foreign aid is 
announced (the smaller is s), the earlier is the expected date of stabilization.  
 
The red function serves as a benchmark as it describes the optimal concession behavior in the 
absence of foreign aid that is given by equation (48). The green, yellow, and blue functions 
show the optimal time of concession as a function of θ for foreign aid announced to arrive in 
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period 15 (v=15) for different announcement dates s, namely s=0, s=5 and s=10.TP50 PT Obviously, 
the lower s the earlier is the optimal time of concession for any given value of θ smaller than 
the respective sθ  and consequently, the earlier is the expected date of stabilization. 
Figure IV.2 illustrates the discussion of the two effects on the expected date of 
stabilization that are induced by a smaller value of v: while foreign aid is announced in period 
one for both the green and the yellow line, it is disbursed in period five for the former and 
only in period fifteen for the latter. As both graphs cross at 865.0≈θ , stabilization will be 
enacted earlier if foreign aid is disbursed in period five instead of in period fifteen for those 
realizations of maxθ for which maxθ > 0.865, while the reverse is true for maxθ < 0.865. This 
underlines the claim that the consequences of foreign aid being disbursed earlier are 
ambiguous ex ante: while an earlier disbursal of foreign aid reduces the range of the cost 
parameter θ for which stabilization is accelerated, it reinforces the phenomenon of 
acceleration for those θs that remain in the (smaller) interval. Consequently, it depends on the 
realization of maxθ  whether an earlier disbursement of foreign aid will delay or accelerate 
stabilization. 
 
Figure IV.3 underlines that the larger a transfer (the smaller β) the larger is its effect on 
the expected date of stabilization. The green line corresponds to a case in which the amount of 
                                                 
TP
50
PT Appendix C exemplifies the calculation of the function describing the optimal concession behavior with 
foreign aid according to equation (36’) for the parameters s=5 and v=15 as it has been conducted in Maple to 
produce the graphs. 
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foreign aid is large enough to cover 100% of discounted future government spending. This 
implies that after foreign aid has arrived neither the conceding nor the enduring interest group 
has to bear any fiscal burden at all. Since the only remaining change from stabilization is the 
end of utility reducing distortions, every interest group has an incentive to concede latest at 
the date at which foreign aid arrives. This explains the peculiar shape of the green line. 
 
5. Criticism 
Drazen criticizes that in Casella and Eichengreen’s model “the recipient country can 
manipulate the amount of aid it receives”TP51 PT without going into further detail. Examining how 
Casella and Eichengreen model lifetime utilities after stabilization helps to analyze this 
statement: e.g. the loser’s lifetime utility after stabilization is given by  
(31) ∫ ∫− ∞− −− −+−= Tv Tv rtrtLT dtgedtgeV 0 αβα .  
A later date of stabilization, T, with T ∈ [s,v], induces a smaller value of v-T, the number of 
periods after stabilization in which foreign aid has not yet been disbursed. This implies that 
the length of the period in which the loser (and the winner) profit from the reduced amount of 
government spending that has to be financed internally, gβ instead of g , increases relative to 
the one in which the total amount of government spending, g , has to be financed internally. 
For a country as a whole, this corresponds to a situation in which a government that stabilizes 
later, that is closer to the date at which aid is disbursed, will receive more aid. Probably, this 
                                                 
TP
51
PT Drazen (2000), p.612. 
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questionable way of modeling donor behavior is due to Casella and Eichengreen’s attempt to 
stay as close to the basic war-of-attrition model as possible, in which lifetime utilities after 
stabilization, LTV  and 
W
TV , are evaluated at the date of stabilization (compare equation (23)). 
Evaluating lifetime utilities after stabilization at date zero would be more intuitive: 
(49) ∫ ∫∞ −− −+−= vT v rtrtLT dtgedtgeV αβα . 
Both equation (31) and equation (49) assume that the date at which the reduction of internally 
financed government expenditure starts corresponds to the one at which foreign aid is 
disbursed, v. Using the more intuitive equation (49), the share of per period reduction of 
government spendingβ  that remains to be financed internally can be calculated by solving 
the following equation for β  
(50) ∫∞ −− =−v vtr fdtgeß )()1( , 
where f corresponds to the absolute value of the disbursed amount of foreign aid at date v: 
fe
r
g
v
vtr =−
− ∞−− ])1([ )(β  
f
r
g =− )1( β  
g
rf−= 1β , 
where 10 << β  by definition. One could guess that this is the calculation that Casella and 
Eichengreen have in mind since they use a shareβ  that is independent of the date of 
stabilization. But evaluating lifetime utilities after stabilization at date T instead of date zero, 
as they do as equation (31) underlines, implies that the date v-T is the reference date for 
determiningβ . Consequently, instead of equation (50) we have to use the following equation 
to determine the appropriate value ofβ : 
(51) ∫∞− −− =−Tv vtr fdtgeß )()1( , 
which yields, after solving for β ,  
(52) rTe
g
rfT −−= 1)(β ,  
that is, aβ  whose value does depend on the date of stabilization, T. More precisely, as  
(53) 0)](1[)`(
2
>−== − Tre
g
frT rT ββ ,  
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a later date of stabilization implies that a higher amount of government spending has to be 
financed internally. In other words, if the absolute amount of aid is spread over a longer 
interval the per period amount of reduction in internally financed government spending will 
be smaller. Specifying β  as in equation (52) seems to be more reasonable than to assume that 
a later date of stabilization will be rewarded by a larger amount of foreign aid. 
What are the implications for the equilibrium concession behavior of β  being described 
by equation (52) instead of being an exogenous parameter? The loser’s lifetime utility is now 
given by  
(54) ]))(1(1[)( )(
0
TvrTv
Tv
rtrtL
T eTr
gdtgeTdtgeV −−
− ∞
−
−− −−−=−+−= ∫ ∫ βααβα , 
with β  defined by equation (52). Consequently,  
(55) 0))](1())(1([/ )()( =−+−−−= −−−− TrereT
r
gdTdV TvrTvrLT ββα . 
Substituting the functional forms depicted in equations (54) and (55) in equation (A3) yields 
the slope of the optimal time of concession function: 
(56) 
)]
~~(ˆ2/1[
)
~~(ˆ)12(
)(
)(
0)
~~(ˆ)2/1(
/)]
~~(ˆ)
~~(ˆ)1([
)(
)()`(
~~
Tr
T
F
f
Tgg
rTgTg
F
fT
σαθ
σα
θ
θ
σαθ
σασα
θ
θθ
−+
−−=
−−+
+−−−= , 
where )())(1(1)(ˆ tvrett −−−−= βσ . Examining whether the condition for foreign aid to 
unambiguously accelerate stabilization, )`()`(
~~ θθ TT > θ∀ , is met yields 
>
−+
−−
)]
~~(ˆ2/1[
)
~~(ˆ)12(
)(
)(
Tr
T
F
f
σαθ
σα
θ
θ
]2/1[
)12(
)(
)(
αθ
α
θ
θ
−+
−−
rF
f . 
As long as the assumption justified above that αθ >+ 2/1  is maintained, this inequality can 
be shown to reduce to the condition 2/1]2/1)[
~~(ˆ +<+ θθσ T  or 
(57) 1)
~~(ˆ <Tσ  
that will always be met since 1)(ˆ0 << tσ  t∀ . 
Thus, the corrected model’s central insight that anticipated foreign aid unambiguously 
accelerates stabilization policies carries over to a more realistic context in which a recipient 
country cannot manipulate the amount of aid it receives. As incentives to artificially delay 
stabilization will be eliminated if a later date of stabilization does no longer induce a higher 
inflow of foreign aid, one would expect stabilization to take place even earlier than in the 
corrected version of Casella and Eichengreen’s model presented in section 3. 
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5. Robustness of results 
How robust are these results with respect to changes in the underlying utility functions? It 
might be especially interesting to investigate whether Casella and Eichengreen’s main result 
that the timing of foreign aid decides on whether stabilization is accelerated or delayed can be 
obtained for specific functional assumptions. For the timing of announcement and disbursal of 
foreign aid to be crucial, the cost parameter θ must not cancel when the slopes of the optimal 
time of concession functions, )`(~ θT  and T`(θ), are compared at sθ  and vθ  to investigate the 
necessary and the sufficient condition for stabilization to be accelerated. As θ appears only in 
the term f(θ)/F(θ) that is the same for )`(~ θT  and T`(θ) as well as in denominators, this 
requires the denominators of )`(~ θT  and T`(θ), dTdVrVu LfaLfa /−+−  and LrVu +−  
respectively, not to be the same. But with continuous time it is easy to show that 
denominators will always be same as long as the loser’s flow utility after stabilization before 
foreign aid has been disbursed, L vtU < , and the loser’s flow utility after stabilization after 
foreign aid has been disbursed, L vtU ≥ , do not depend on the date of stabilization, T. The loser’s 
lifetime utility after stabilization with anticipated foreign aid is defined as 
(58) ∫ ∫− ∞−−≥−−<∞− −≥−< −+−=+= Tv Tvrt
L
vtTvrt
L
vt
Tv
rtL
vt
rtL
vt
L
fa er
Ue
r
UdteUdteUV
0 0
][][  
        ]][[/1 )( L vt
L
vt
TvrL
vt UUeUr <≥
−−
< −+=  
so that 
(59) ][)( L vt
L
vt
Tvr
L
fa UUe
dT
dV
<≥
−− −= . 
The loser’s lifetime utility after stabilization in the absence of foreign aid is given by 
(60) ∫∞ ∞−− =−== 0 0][ rUer
U
dteUV
L
rt
L
rtLL ,  
where LU  corresponds to the loser’s flow utility in the absence of foreign aid. As LL vt UU =< , 
it follows that 
(61) LL vt
L
fa
L
fa rVUdTdVrV ==− <  
and denominators of )`(~ θT  and T`(θ) will always be the same. Consequently, it will not be 
possible to find any functional forms for LU , L vtU < , and 
L
vtU ≥  that support Casella and 
Eichengreen’s claim that the timing of announcement and disbursal of foreign aid is decisive 
for whether foreign aid accelerates or delays stabilization as long as time is modeled 
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continuously and L vtU <  and 
L
vtU ≥  do not depend on the date of stabilization, T. The latter 
condition is not met for the modified version of the model presented in section five in which 
)(TU L vt≥ . Thus, for the modified model, the line of reasoning offered above is not sufficient to 
exclude the possibility that there might be functional forms for which the timing of foreign aid 
is crucial.TP52 PT 
How robust is the result that anticipated foreign aid induces stabilization to be accelerated 
and not to be delayed? The result that the changes in LrV  and dTdV L /  induced by the 
addition of anticipated foreign aid to the war-of-attrition model just cancel has been shown to 
be valid for a huge class of functional forms. Keeping the assumptions that foreign aid 
reduces the amount of government spending that has to be financed by internal taxes and that 
the loser bears a larger burden of taxes after stabilization and consequently, profits more from 
the burden’s reduction, the only remaining net effect of anticipated foreign aid on equilibrium 
behavior is that it diminishes the marginal cost of conceding by reducing LW VV − , the 
difference in lifetime utilities of loser and winner after stabilization. Thus, also the corrected 
model’s prediction that the provision of anticipated foreign aid unambiguously accelerates 
stabilizations seems to be robust. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
The main focus of this paper was to address the question whether budget support modeled 
as unconditional foreign aid accruing directly to the government budget accelerates or delays 
macroeconomic stabilizations. Both the different strands of theoretical literature on delayed 
stabilization and empirical evidence have been shown to provide some support for either 
hypothesis. 
Most of the literature arguing in favor of delay builds on the crisis hypothesis that has a lot 
of intuitive appeal and is most convincingly formalized by Velasco’s (1998) common 
property model. Drazen (1999) uses the common property model to show that providing 
foreign aid selectively is a means to accelerate stabilizations. Although the point that the 
                                                 
TP
52
PT In section five, addressing the criticism that the recipient country can manipulate the amount of aid it receives 
by the choice of the date of stabilization, T, has been shown to result in equation (52), that is a β that depends on 
T. Since β enters L vtU ≥  the loser’s flow utility after stabilization and after foreign aid has been disbursed is a 
function of the date of stabilization, )(TU L vt≥ . Consequently, 
(59’) dTdUe
r
UUedTdV L vt
TvrL
vt
L
vt
TvrL
fa ≥
−−
<≥
−− +−= )()( 1][  
and the equality stated in equation (61) is no more valid. 
conditions under which foreign aid is granted are crucial determinants of whether foreign aid 
delays or accelerates stabilizations is quite obvious, so far there have only been very few 
attempts to investigate it more carefully going beyond the distinction of conditional and 
unconditional foreign aid. 
One of the rare specifications of the conditions of foreign aid programs that have been 
incorporated in models attempting to explain delayed stabilization processes is the fact that 
foreign aid is nearly never disbursed unexpectedly, but announced to arrive in government 
consultations long before it is actually disbursed. Casella and Eichengreen (1996) first used 
Alesina and Drazen’s (1991) influential war-of-attrition model to investigate the 
consequences of anticipated foreign aid on the expected date of stabilization. In this paper, 
their result that foreign aid that is announced or disbursed after critical dates for 
announcement and disbursal will delay stabilization has been shown to be based on an 
invalidly modified equilibrium condition. A correct incorporation of anticipated foreign aid in 
the war-of-attrition model yields the result that foreign aid unambiguously accelerates 
stabilization, a result that has been shown to be robust to different specifications of functional 
forms. 
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VI. Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
Derivation of T`(θ) in the war-of-attrition model 
 
Since the optimal time of concession, iT , can be shown to be monotonically decreasing in 
the cost parameter iθ , i.e. 0)`( <iiT θ , what matters for the optimal time of concession is only 
a group’s position on the known distribution function of the cost of distortions parameter θ, 
F(θ), relative to the expected position of the opponent. This result can be exploited in two 
ways: First, it establishes that 1-H(T(θ))=F(θ). The higher a group’s realization of the cost 
parameter θ (the higher F(θ)), the earlier will it optimally concede (the lower T(θ)) and the 
lower is the probability that the opponent will already have conceded at the group’s chosen 
date of concession (the lower H(T(θ)). Second, it implies that choosing a time of concession 
iT  is equivalent to choosing a valueθˆ  and conceding at time T(θˆ ). Thus, another way to 
solve the maximization problem set up in equation (24) is to have a change in variables and to 
maximize over θˆ : 
(A1) )ˆ(),ˆ(max
ˆ
θθθ
θ
FEU = ∫ −− +−θθ θ θˆ )ˆ()( ))](()`()([ TVedxxTexu LrTxrT   
    ∫∫ −−== +−+ θθθ x wxrTzrTxx dxxfxTVedzzTezu )())](()`()([ )()(ˆ . 
Taking the derivative with respect to θˆ  yields, after simplifying the resulting expression and 
dividing it by )ˆ(θrTe− , the following equation that implicitly defines T(θ): 
(A2) 0)ˆ`(])ˆ()[ˆ())]ˆ(())ˆ(()[ˆ( =+−+−− θθθθθθ T
dT
dVrVuFTVTVf
L
LLW .TP53 PT 
Solving (A2) for T`(θ) yields: 
(A3) 
dTdVrVu
VV
F
fT LL
LW
/)(
)()`( −+−
−−= θ
θθ . 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
TP
53
PT This expression corresponds to equation (A5) in Alesina and Drazen (1991) except that it is corrected for a 
missing minus sign in front of f(θ). 
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Appendix B 
Use of the method of partial fractions to derive the expression for T(θ) 
 
Solving equation (25) for T`(θ) yields 
(A4) 
)2/1(
12
)(
)()`( αθ
α
θ
θθ −+
−−=
rF
fT . 
Assume θ to be uniformly distributed on ],[ θθ  so that θθθ −=
1)(f  and θθ
θθθ −
−=)(F . 
Consequently,  
(A5) θαθθθαθ drT )2/1(
11)12()( −+−−−= ∫ .  
The integral is evaluated using the method of partial fractions. The aim is to write  
=−++−=−+− )2/1()2/1(
11
αθθθαθθθ r
BA
r
 
)2/1()(
)()2/1(
αθθθ
θθαθ
−+−
−+−+
r
BAr  
for some constants A and B. Setting the denominators equal implies 
)()2/1(1 θθαθ −+−+= BAr  for all θ. Setting θθ =  yields  
(A6) 
)2/1(
1
αθ −+= rA .  
Setting θθ =  and making use of the expression for A yields  
(A7) 
)2/1( αθ −+−= r
rB . 
Substituting the expressions for A and B given by (A6) and (A7) in (A5) yields 
θαθθθθαθαθ dr
rd
r
T ∫ ∫ −+−−−+−−= )2/1(1[)2/1( 1)12()( ] 
         Cr
r
+−+−−−+−−= ))]2/1(ln()[ln()2/1(
1)12( αθθθαθα , 
where the constant of integration, C, is defined by the boundary condition .0)( =θT  
Evaluating the boundary condition yields the optimal time of concession function as depicted 
by equation (26) 
(A8) )]ln()
2/1
2/1[ln(
)2/1(
12)( θθ
θθ
αθ
αθ
αθ
αθ −
−−−+
−+
−+
−=
r
T . 
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